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INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977' (FCPA or Act) is one of
the United States' most controversial federal laws. Supporters of the Act
insist that United States export trade has increased in the years since the
Act's passage, while opponents argue that, notwithstanding this apparent
increase, the Act unduly restrains United States corporations. Almost
every session of Congress since passage of the FCPA has included a bill
to amend it, but it has thus far defied alteration. Businesses cry out in
vain for guidelines. Finally, effective enforcement appears to be impossible even though the Department of Justice (DOJ) has brought a number
of enforcement proceedings against United States corporations and citizens for violations of the Act..
This Article examines some of the paradoxes that the FCPA creates.
Part II sets forth the sequence of events that led to the Act's passage.
Part III outlines the Act, describes some of the major criticisms of the
FCPA and discusses its proposed amendments. Part IV discusses the review procedures that the DOJ has adopted and assesses the chances for a
new review procedure or FCPA guidelines, or both. Part V examines the
enforcement actions taken under the FCPA and includes a discussion of

1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 1498
(1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1982)) [hereinafter FCPA].
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the investigative procedures of the DOJ. Finally, part VI of this Article
considers the future of the FCPA.
II.

BACKGROUND TO THE ACT

A.

Origin of the Act

The FCPA originated in post-Watergate morality.2 The press, whose
revelations had been instrumental in the collapse of the Nixon Administration, moved quickly to report allegations of illicit United States corporate payments to foreign governments. The resulting scandal embarrassed the United States and threatened foreign relations.' The discovery
of payments by Lockheed to the Prime Minister of Japan, for example,
forced his resignation and chilled relations between the two countries.4
Reports that Lockheed had paid Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands $1
million compelled him to relinquish his official functions. 5 Finally, reputed payments by Lockheed, Exxon, Mobil, Gulf and other corporations to the Italian Government caused the Italian President to resign
and strained United States relations with Italy, the surrounding Mediterranean area and the entire North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) alliance.'
The extensive coverage given to these incidents, accompanied by indignant editorial comment, led the Securities and Exchange Commission

2., G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 17-19 (1982); Goebel, Professional Responsibility Issues in Inter-

national Law Practice, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 27-28 (1981); Comment, The Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977: An Analysis of Its Impact and Future, 5 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 405, 407 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future].
3. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977)
[hereinafter H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS]; Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future,

supra note 2, at 408.
4. H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 5; Timmeny, An Overview
of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 235, 238 (1982); Wade, An Examination
of the Provisions and Standards of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 255,
256 (1982); Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future, supra note 2, at 408 n.25.
5. Timmeny, supra note 4, at 238; Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future, supra
note 2, at 408 n.25; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, Hous. & URB. AFF., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED DISCLOSURE
ACTS OF 1977, S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) [hereinafter S. REP.,
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES], reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4098, 4101; H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 5.
6. H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 5; Timmeny, supra note 4,

at 238; Wade, supra note 4, at 256; Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future, supra note
2, at 408 n.25.
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(SEC) to investigate a number of companies formally and to institute a
voluntary disclosure program.' The SEC received startling responses
from businesses regarding questionable or illegal payments to foreign officials. Over 400 companies admitted or voluntarily disclosed that they
had indeed made such payoffs at one time or another,' aggregating hundreds of millions of dollars.9
Congressional reaction followed swiftly. Senate and House hearings to
determine the scope of the problem revealed a widespread use of bribes10
and led to the conclusion that some form of legislation was necessary to
prevent this conduct." A broad consensus existed in Congress that bribery was not only unethical but also unnecessary. 2 Legislators agreed
that questionable payments corrupted and short-circuited the country's
competitive free-enterprise system, and created serious foreign policy
problems. Congressmen and others voiced fears that such payments by
American companies had already tarnished the image of our system and
affected the integrity and reputation of United States corporations. 3 The

7. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 1 (1981) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT]; Atkeson, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act~of 1977: An InternationalApplication of SEC's Corporate Governance Reforms, 12 INT'L LAW. 703, 707 (1978);
Timmeny, supra note 4, at 235-37; cf. Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future, supra

note 2, at 408 .(SEC tried to get corporations to regulate themselves voluntarily).

8.

H.R.

REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS,

supra note 3, at 4; GAO

REPORT,

supra

supra note 3, at 4; GAO

REPORT,

supra

note 7, at 1; Atkeson, supra note 7, at 707.

9. H.R.

REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS,

note 7, at 1; Atkeson, supra note 7, at 707.
10. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 1; Soloman & Gustman, Questionable and
Illegal Payments by American Corporations,1980 J. Bus. L. 67, 70; Comment, FCPA:
Impact and Future, supra note 2, at 408.
11. H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 4-5; S. REP., FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 4, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4101.
12. H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 4-5; S. REP., FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4101.
13. H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 4-5; S. REP., FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 3-4, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4101; Maurice, Questionable Overseas Payments: Going Around One
More Time, 15 GONZ. L. REv. 459, 465 (1980); Wade, supra note 4, at 256. Congress'
decision to enact legislation recognized certain policy considerations: (1) belief that payment of bribes countered the moral expectations and values of the American public; (2)
concern over public scandal and resulting foreign policy problems; (3) prevention of distortion of commercial competition; (4) termination of corruption in allied governments;
and (5) minimization of foreign mistrust of United States business and improvement of
American reputation for honesty. Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices
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SEC emphasized that hidden payments necessarily deceive investors who
examine a company's balance sheets, 14 and that this deception might violate the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 193415
(1934 Act).
B.

Legislative History of the Act

The main purpose of the Act at the time of its inception was clear-to
prevent United States corporations from bribing foreign officials."' Two
methods were proposed to accomplish this goal. The first required the
accurate disclosure and recordkeeping of all payments, whether made to
foreign officials only or expended in the regular course of business. The
second proposal criminalized foreign bribery. Much debate arose as to
which of these preventive measures was more appropriate." Those who
argued against criminalization and the extraterritorial application of
American law and values emphasized the practical difficulties and foreign policy consequences of prohibiting overseas bribery.1 8 These legisla-

Act of 1977: A Step Toward Clarificationand Consolidation,73 J.

CRIM. L. & CRIMI1740, 1745 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Amending the, FCPA]; see also
Wade, supra note 4, at 256-57.
14. One of the SEC's greatest concerns was that illicit payments and other corrupt
practices would cast doubt on the integrity and reliability of corporate books and records,
which are essential to the disclosure system established by the federal securities law. See
NOLOGY

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, Hous. AND URB. AFF., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 15, 23-24, 48-49 (Comm.

Print 1976) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]; GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 69-71. As reported by Wallace Timmeny, the former Deputy Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, the SEC employed several theories in analyzing the consequences of illegal
corporate payments. These theories originated in the investor's fundamental right to
know whether management is running a company according to sound business judgment.
Accordingly, the investor had a right to know whether management: (1) had tampered
with the corporate books; (2) had used or was using invested funds to violate United
States or foreign laws; (3) had obtained business through bribery, or had subjected the
company to loss of business if the bribes were discovered; and (4) had disbursed company
funds to consultants with no accountability by the consultants for the use of those funds.
Timmeny, supra note 4, at 235-36.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982); see SEC REPORT, supra note 14, at 19-20.
16. Brock, ProgressReport on Efforts to Amend the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct,
1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1083, 1085; Maurice, supra note 13, at 460, 467.

17. H.R.

REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS,

supra note 3, at 6; Soloman & Gustman,

supra note 10, at 71; Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future, supra note 2, at 408.

18. See G.

GREANIAS

& D.

WINDSOR,

supra note 2, at 53; Soloman & Gustman,

supra note 10, at 71. A particular problem focused on the appropriateness of a criminal
standard by which to measure conduct abroad. See G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra
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tors and representatives of the business community believed that enforcement problems would outweigh any effectiveness of sanctions against
bribery. 9 A particular concern existed about unfairness and possible violations of the confrontation clause or lack of due process if the DOJ or
SEC could not produce necessary foreign evidence and witnesses in this
country.20 Finally, those arguing against criminalization suggested that a
criminal standard, more than any other preventive measure, would unduly burden United States corporations in competition with foreign companies that did engage in bribery.21
Equally compelling arguments existed for criminalizing foreign
payoffs. Proponents perceived the outright prohibition of certain conduct
as a much more direct and practical solution than mere disclosure or
recordkeeping,22 and they hoped that governmental interdiction would
provide an excuse for corporate officials to resist demands for extortion.2"
Finally, proponents believed criminalization was necessary to emphasize
the national policy against foreign bribery. 4

note 2, at 139-40. Much concern-and skepticism-existed in Washington at the start of
the Carter Administration over the President's strong stance on human rights. While
many believed President Carter's position was admirable from an ethical viewpoint, they
were also aware that other nations might not appreciate being told that they were "evil."
Despite the fact that President Carter himself and his Cabinet had very little to do with
the actual passage of the FCPA, many perceived it as part of his "human rights" package and an additional attempt to export United States morality. See id. at 69-70.
19. See infra notes 316-19 and accompanying text.
20. Id.
21. See Soloman & Gustman, supra note 10, at 71; Comment, Amending the FCPA,
supra note 13, at 1745; cf. Goebel, supra note 2, at 28 (United States businessmen think
it inappropriate to hold them to standards that other countries do not impose upon their
businessmen).
22. These legislators viewed criminalization as a greater deterrent than disclosure
because the effectiveness of the latter depends heavily on actual disclosure by the reporting company. The threat of only a civil penalty would cause many businesses to choose
simply to ignore the disclosure requirements as costly and unprofitable and to risk discovery of the payment. Criminalization, on the other hand, deals with absolutes: one
becomes criminally liable for some act of malfeasance or nonfeasance. The enforcement
burden in both cases is roughly the same because the elements of both nondisclosure and
illegal payments overlap. Therefore, many lawmakers believed criminalization was the

wiser approach. See H.R.

REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS,

supra note 3, at 6; Soloman &

Gustman, supra note 10, at 71; Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future, supra note 2, at
409.
23. See Soloman & Gustman, supra note 10, at 71.
24. See H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 6; S. REP., FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4101; G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 70; Maurice, supra
note 13, at 460.
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The early bills on foreign payments acknowledged these concerns.
Senate Bill S. 366425 required both accurate recordkeeping and disclosure as well as criminalization.2 6 The Bill compelled companies that registered with the SEC to keep accurate books and records27 and to institute a system of internal accounting controls.2" It also prohibited the
falsification of books and records, 29 the deception of auditors in the
course of an audit" and the payment of overseas bribes.3 l The Bill
passed the Senate on September 15, 1976, and was reported to the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. 2 However, the
94th Congress ended before further progress was made on the Bill. 3
During the 95th Congress the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs heard testimony on Senate Bill S. 305,34 which
was identical to the earlier bill S. 3664.11 S. 305 again passed the Senate
after minor amendments by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs.3" Meanwhile, the House was considering H.R.

25. S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 30,426 (1976).
26. See G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 62; Note, In Search of an

InternationalSolution to Bribery: The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 on CorporateBehavior, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 367 (1979) [hereinafter
Note, In Search of an InternationalSolution].
27.

S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § (2)(A) (1976); see Note, In Search of an Inter-

national Solution, supra note 26, at 367.
28.

S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § (2)(B) (1976); see Note, In Search of an Inter-

national Solution, supra note 26, at 367.
29. S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § (3) (1976); see Note, In Search of an International Solution, supra note 26, at 367.
30. S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § (4)(A), (B) (1976); see Note, In Search of an

InternationalSolution, supra note 26, at 367.
31. S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 30A (1976); see Note, In Search of an International Solution, supra note 26, at 367.
32. See S. REP., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 4099; G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra
note 2, at 62; Note, In Search of an InternationalSolution, supra note 26, at 367.
33. See S. REP., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4099; G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra
note 2, at 62; Note, In Search of an InternationalSolution, supra note 26, at 367.
34. S. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices

and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure Acts of 1977: Hearings on S. 305
Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urb. Aff., 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977).
35. See S. REP., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 4099; G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra
note 2, at 63; Note, In Search of an International Solution, supra note 26, at 367;
compare S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) with S. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
36. See G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 63; Note, In Search of an

InternationalSolution, supra note 26, at 367.

438

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 20:431

3815,3" a bill on unlawful corporate payments. H.R. 3815 differed from
S. 305 by taking solely a criminalization approach to the problem of
foreign payments. 38 A Conference Committee considered both H.R. 3815
and S. 305 and sent a modified version of S. 305-disclosure and
criminalization-to both Houses. 9 Congress believed its dual approach
of disclosure and criminalization would be the strongest deterrent to
bribery or the concealment of bribery.'0 Congress also believed that this
approach would leave no doubt about its serious intent to eliminate bribery. The Bill passed with little debate, and President Carter signed it
into law on December 19, 1977.41 The entire legislative process took less
than one year. Unfortunately, the swiftness with which Congress enacted
the FCPA is altogether too evident, and the inherent ambiguity of its
provisions may have led to the loss of legitimate American business opportunities abroad.
III.

THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

A.

Provisions of the Act

The FCPA was codified as an amendment to the 1934 Act. 42 The criminal prohibition of and civil injunction against foreign payments are

37. H.R. 3815, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 36,303 (1977).
38. See H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 6; G. GREANIAS & D.
WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 63; Note, In Search of an International Solution, supra
note 26, at 367; compare H.R. 3815, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) with S. 305, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
39. See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. OF CONFERENCE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, H.R. CON. REP. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9,

reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4121, 4121; G. GREANIAS & D.
WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 63; Note, In Search of an International Solution, supra
note 26, at 368.

40. See H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 6; Maurice, supra note
13, at 460; Soloman & Gustman, supra note 10, at 71; Comment, FCPA: Impact and
Future, supra note 2, at 409.
41. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 123 CONG. REC. 38,776 (1977); see Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill: Statement on Signing S. 305
into Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977). The Carter Administration had very limited involvement in the passage of the Act. The SEC and Congress
had conducted most of their hearings by the time Carter took office. The Act passed
through Congress far too quickly for the President to have had much input. See supra
note 18.
42. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977); see
Witherspoon, Multinational Corporations-GovernmentalRegulation of Business Ethics Under the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977: An Analysis, 87 DICK. L. REV.
531, 542 (1983); cf. Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of 1977 and the Regulation of Ques-
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found in the Act's antibribery provisions. The disclosure requirements
take the form of accounting provisions.
1. The Antibribery Provisions
The antibribery provisions of the Act carry criminal penalties of $1
million fines for any corporation,4 3 and $10 thousand fines plus possible
prison sentences of up to five years for any individual,4" found to have
violated the Act. Three conditions make a foreign payment unlawful.
First, the payment must be made "corruptly. '4 5 This unequivocal requirement has caused a great deal of interpretive difficulty because the
' "Corruptness" itself does not suffice,
Act does not define "corruptly." 46
however, leading to the second requirement of a "business nexus": the
payment must be made to assist someone in obtaining or retaining business.4 Finally, the payment or offer to pay (completion of the payment
is not required for a violation of the Act) must be made using some

tionable Payments, 34 Bus. LAW. 623, 641 (1979) [hereinafter FCPA and Questionable
Payments] (statement of Harvey L. Pitt, Gen. Couns., SEC) ("[T]he Foreign Corrupt

Practices Act has to be viewed as an integral part of the Securities Exchange Act and all
the law and lore that has developed over the years in that context.").
43. FCPA § 104(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(1)(A) (1982); see Atkeson, supra
note 7, at 713; Comment, The Foreign CorruptPractices Act: Curse or Cure?, 19 AM.
Bus. L.J. 73, 75 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, FCPA: Curse or Cure?].
44. FCPA § 104(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(1)(B) (1982); see Atkeson, supra
note 7, at 713; Comment, FCPA: Curse or Cure?, supra note 43, at 75.
45. FCPA § 104(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1982); see Atkeson, supra note 7, at
713, 715; Maurice, supra note 13, at 489; Shine, The Antibribery Provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: THREE YEARS
AFTER PASSAGE 100 (Practicing Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series, No. 360, 1981); Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future, supra note 2,
at 420.
46. The United States Code contains at least twenty laws that involve a "corrupt"
standard, and yet do not define "corrupt." See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 266 (persons to whom
provisions of chapter on the Congress apply); 7 U.S.C. § 12a (registration of commission
merchants and brokers who have engaged in corrupt acts); 10 U.S.C. § 931 (perjury
statute applicable to Armed Forces); 18 U.S.C. § 201 (bribery of public officials and
witnesses); 18 U.S.C. § 215 (receipt of gifts for procuring loans); 18 U.S.C. § 1503
(influencing or injuring officer, juror or witness); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (obstruction of
proceedings).
47. FCPA § 104(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1982); see Atkeson, supra note 7, at
715; FCPA and Questionable Payments, supra note 42, at 627 (statement of Timothy
Atkeson, Chairperson, Committee on Multinational Corporations); Timmeny, SEC Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 2 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN.
25, 32 (1979); Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future, supra note 2, at 421.
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means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails.4" Nearly
anything will satisfy this requirement; of the three, it is the least difficult
to establish.
The antibribery provisions apply to two classes of legal persons. They
prohibit "any issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to
[section 12 of the 1934 Act] or which is required to file reports under
section [15(d) of that title], or . . . any officer, director, employee, or
agent ... or any stockholder . . . of such issuer"4' 9 from making foreign
payments. They also subject "domestic concerns"-which the Act defines
as "any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United
States" 50 or any "corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship""1 that either has its principal place of business in the United States
or is organized under the laws of a United States state, territory, possession or commonwealth-to the same prohibitions. 2
The Act forbids unlawful payments to three categories of recipients.
Foreign officials probably comprise the largest potential class of recipients because they include "any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity." 53 However, they do not include any
foreign governmental employee "whose duties are essentially ministerial
'
or clerical." 54
Commentators have interpreted this exclusion to permit
so-called facilitating or grease payments." The Act does not define these
payments, but they are generally held to be payments "which merely
move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or which do

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

FCPA § 104(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1982).
Id. § 103(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1982).
Id. § 104(d)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(1)(A) (1982).
Id. § 104(d)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(1)(B) (1982).
Id. § 104(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1982).
Id. § 104(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982).
Id.
55. See H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 8; Atkeson, supra note
7, at 716; Shine, supra note 45, at 104; Soloman & Gustman, supra note 10, at 73;
Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future, supra note 2, at 420; Note, Is the SEC the Appropriate Federal Agency for Policing Bribery of Foreign Nationals by Multinational
Public Corporations?,13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 517, 530 (1981); Note, The Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct: Problems of ExtraterritorialApplication, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 698 (1979) thereinafter Note, FCPA: ExtraterritorialApplication]. One
may also imply justification for grease payments from the requirement that an unlawful
payment be made "corruptly." See Brennan, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977: "Clarifying" or "Gutting" a Law?, 11 J. LEGIS. 56, 65 (1984); Maurice,
supra note 13, at 486; Soloman & Gustman, supra note 10, at 73.
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not involve any discretionary action."' 56 The Act also interdicts payments
to foreign political parties or candidates for office. 5' Finally, the FCPA
prohibits payments to any person when the payor knows or has reason to
know "that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be
offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly," 58 to any foreign official, political party or candidate for office. Essentially, this part of the
Act pertains to payments made through intermediary foreign agents used
by a corporation to transact business.5 9 A corporation may not pay commissions to an agent if it knows or suspects that the agent will use the
funds to bribe a foreign official. A request for an unusually large, unmerited commission provides an immediate warning that the agent does
not intend to keep the entire amount he receives. The Act prohibits any
use of an agent to do indirectly what a company could not do directly,
for example, bribe a foreign official. Therefore, a corporation will be
liable for the acts of its agents if it knew or had reason to know that its
agents would make a bribe using the commission money.
Enforcement of the antibribery provisions is bifurcated. Under section
103 of the Act, the SEC has civil enforcement authority over violations
by issuers or persons related to issuers."0 Section 104 gives the DOJ civil
and criminal enforcement authority over domestic concerns.6"
2.

The Accounting Provisions

The accounting provisions of the Act may have deterred illicit payments more than any other section of the FCPA, at least with regard to
public corporations. The disclosure requirements, as the accounting provisions of the FCPA set forth, apply to all issuers registered under the
1934 Act.62 Issuers must "make and keep books, records, and accounts,
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions

56. H.R. REP., UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS, supra note 3, at 8; see Atkeson, supra note
7, at 716; Soloman & Gustman, supra note 10, at 73; Comment, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977: A Solution or A Problem?, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 111, 122
(1981).
57. FCPA § 104(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(2) (1982).
58. Id. § 104(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3) (1982).
59. S. REP., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 10, reprintedin 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4108; Shine, supra note 45, at 105.
60. See Atkeson, supra note 7, at 705; Shine, supra note 45, at 98-99; Witherspoon,
supra note 42, at 545; Comment, FCPA: Curse or Cure?, supra note 43, at 76.
61. See Shine, supra note 45, at 98-99; Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 545; Comment, FCPA: Curse or Cure?, supra note 43, at 76.
62. FCPA §§ 102-103, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 8m, 78dd-1 (1982).
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and dispositions of [their] assets." 6 They must also "devise and maintain
a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable
assurances" 6 4 that all transactions are authorized and recorded in such a
way as to comply with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
and to maintain accountability for the assets, 5 that any access to assets is
authorized, and that the books and records are periodically checked
against existing assets to determine any possible discrepancies. 67 The
SEC has civil enforcement authority against these issuers.
B.

Criticisms of the Act

The United States business community and foreign sovereigns have
not received the FCPA enthusiastically. One cannot expect the Act to
succeed since it is a unilateral effort to eliminate foreign bribery. 8 Commentators have attacked it as an arrogant attempt by the United States to
export its morality and enforce its laws extraterritorially.6 9 These accusations cast doubt, once again, on the wisdom of having a criminalization
approach to foreign payments, raising anew the issues of enforcement
difficulties and potential foreign relations problems in the application of
United States penal laws abroad.
1. The Antibribery Provisions
The greatest criticism of the antibribery provisions is that the language is vague, ° which is a consequence of the Act's hasty enactment.
63.

Id. § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1982).

64. Id. § 102(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (1982).
65.

Id. § 102(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (1982).

66.

Id. § 102(b)(2)(B)(iii), 15 U.S.c. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(iii) (1982).

67. Id. § 102(b)(2)(B)(iv), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(iv) (1982).
68. Surrey, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime,
20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 293, 301 (1979); Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 553; Pierce,
Should the FCPA be Amended or Repealed?, Legal Times of Wash., Jan. 7, 1980, at
13, col. 3; see Barone & Kim, InternationalPayoffs: Profits and Morality, 4 INT'L J.
COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 57, 60 (1980).
69. Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 553; see G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra
note 2, at 122; Bader & Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 627, 628 (1983). But see Wade, supra note 4, at 260-61 ("It
is an oversimplification to characterize the FCPA as merely an effort to export
morality.").
70. There is a general consensus that the Act is vague. Nearly every proposed
amendment has suggested clarifications to the Act. These suggestions have included new
definitions of "domestic concern" and "foreign officials," deletion of the "reason to
know" language, replacing it with "directs or authorizes" language and the enumeration
of specific exemptions in the Act, particularly for any payment lawful in the foreign
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Unambiguous interpretation of certain phrases of the FCPA antibribery
provisions is crucial to effective enforcement of the Act without imposing
any undue 7'hardships on United States businesses. Key terms include
"corruptly,"

"in furtherance of,"7 2 "foreign official, '

73

"obtaining or

and "knowing or having reason to know."7 5 The
retaining business,
Act leaves most of these terms undefined,7 causing one commentator to
complain that the FCPA is "not polished legislation."" The Act interprets only the phrase "foreign official." It leaves unexplained other language that could easily be misconstrued or interpreted in more than one
way. This lack of definition has caused commentators to remark that
"every major piece of new legislation comes replete with language that
' 4

will gain definition with time and practice .... The difference with the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is that . . . these various words and

phrases are themselves not going to admit of definition ....
The "knowing or having reason to know" language in the FCPA is
presently one of the areas that causes the most concern in the American
business community.1 9 The Act and its legislative history delineate no
boundaries for this uncertain standard, and commentators generally consider it too harsh for a number of reasons. Critics have noted the absence
of a similar "reason to know" standard in the domestic bribery statute. 0
Furthermore, the standard holds United States companies liable for the
acts of their agents overseas without giving any guidance as to the extent
to which the corporations should investigate the agents.8" Does "reason
country. G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 97; Brennan, supra note 55, at

62; Roberts & Abbott, The Law of Questionable Foreign Payments: Implicationsfor
American International Business, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS

IN INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS IN

1982, at 123, 153 (1982); Witherspoon,

supra note 42, at 560; Comment, Modifying the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The
Searchfor a PracticalStandard,4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 203, 207 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Modifying the FCPA]; see Bader & Shaw, supra note 69, at 628.
71. FCPA § 104(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1982).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 104(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982).
74. Id. § 104(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1) (1982).
75. Id. § 104(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3) (1982).
76. G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 97; Comment, FCPA: Impact
and Future, supra note 2, at 406; see Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 560.
77. Surrey, supra note 68, at 296.
78. G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 97.
79. Bader & Shaw, supra note 69, at 634; Comment, Modiffing the FCPA, supra
note 70, at 209-10.
80. Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 562.
81. See Maurice, supra note 13, at 483-85; Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 562;
Comment, Amending the FCPA, supra note 13, at 1758.
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to know" mean full, actual knowledge that an agent has conveyed or will
convey part of a commission to a foreign official? Or does some constructive knowledge standard, which is less than actual knowledge, satisfy the
"reason to know" requirement? If so, how much less actual knowledge is
necessary? The Act never makes this standard clear.8 2 An enforcement
body may very well attribute knowledge to a corporation that it has only
in hindsight. 8
The definition of "foreign official" in the Act also contributes to interpretive problems. The FOPA excludes from its prohibitions any payments made to employees whose duties are essentially "ministerial or
clerical."" However, the FOPA does not define the limits of the term
"ministerial;" therefore, it becomes impossible to determine the degree of
discretion a clerk may possess or to what extent the activity he performs
85
is in fact ministerial.
Perhaps no word in the Act causes as much interpretational difficulty
as does the word "corruptly." Corrupt conduct is intentional conduct in
which one engages with an evil motive."6 The question arises as to
whether negligent conduct can be corrupt. Normally, criminal sanctions
attach only to conduct that constitutes a crime. Such conduct requires a
"concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand. ' 87 Bribery consists of an intent to influence, which forms the mens rea, accompanied by the corrupt giving of something of value, which completes the
actus reus.88 The absence of one of these elements negates the criminal-

82. See Brennan, supra note 55, at 62-63. A question exists whether a reckless payment will satisfy this standard. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
83. This may not in fact be a serious problem. No case brought during the last
decade has hinged on this circumstance. See Statement of John C.Keeney, Deputy Ass't
Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., Crim. Div., before the Senate Subcomm. on Int'l Fin.
and Monetary Pol'y Concerning S.430 at 3 (June 10, 1986) [hereinafter Keeney Statement]; S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1986) (additional views of Senator
Proxmire on S.430).

84. FCPA § 104(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982).
85. Surrey, supra note 68, at 299; Comment, Amending the FCPA, supra note 13,
at 1752.
86. S.REP., FOREIGN CURRENT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 10, reprintedin 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4108; Atkeson, supra note 7, at 715; Elden &
Sableman, Negligence Is Not Corruption:The Scienter Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 819, 828 (1981); Maurice, supra note 13,
at 483; Shine, supra note 45, at 103.
87. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952). This is the traditional
requirement of the mens rea as well as the actus reus.
88. See United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401 (2d Cir. 1966).
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ity of the act, making criminal sanctions unsuitable.8 9 In other words,
criminal punishment is appropriate only in instances of willful, intentional and wrongful behavior.9 0 The proper reading of "corruptly" in
conjunction with the "reason to know" language demonstrates that acting with constructive knowledge should not suffice."1 Corruptness requires intent and, therefore, actual knowledge. 92 Thus, it seems fairly
certain that mere negligence will not result in a violation of the FCPA.9"

89. Questions are raised as to whether the Act exempts extortion payments from its
scope. The legislative history of the FCPA indicates clearly that the antibribery provisions do not cover a true extortion payment, such as a payment made to prevent a threat
of terrorist activity. S. REP., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 11, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4108. However, the Act does not
provide a defense to a claim that a governmental official demanded the payment as the
price for gaining entry to a foreign market or obtaining a contract. At some point, the
United States corporation would have to make a conscious decision whether to make the
payment. If a corporation pays the bribe, there is a corrupt intent on the part of the
payor. Id. at 10, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4108. This is
precisely the type of payment that Congress intended to forbid. See infra notes 363-75
and accompanying text.
90. Elden & Sableman, supra note 86, at 828, 834.
91. Id. at 828. If a corporation is held liable for the acts of an overseas agent, but
has only some form of constructive knowledge of the payments, then it is being held
criminally liable for an act which, for the corporation, constitutes mere negligence.
92. Id. A corporation does not violate the FCPA merely by paying an agent commissions and suspecting that the agent will pass some portion of the payment to a foreign
official. Rather, the corporation must "corruptly ... pay.., money... or... anything
of value to... any person, while knowing or having reason to know" that the agent will
in turn pay some government official. FCPA § 103(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3)
(1982) (emphasis added). Thus, the company must intend that the agent will convey
payment to a foreign official. Of course, the "reason to know" standard creates the difficulty of a reckless payment in this situation and whether recklessness satisfies the reason
to know standard. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. In any event, recklessness is not negligence. Therefore, it seems safe to say that negligence does not violate the
Act.
93. A bifurcated standard may be desirable as far as "corruptness" is concerned.
Proof of an evil intent requires some form of subjective standard. This does not create
difficulties when the DOJ or SEC alleges that the corrupt payment was made directly by
an issuer or domestic concern through one of its officers or directors. There generally is
no undue burden in requiring the SEC or DOJ to prove the subjective intent of an issuer
or domestic concern that they can subject to process within the boundaries of the United
States. Difficulties arise, however, when the DOJ or SEC alleges that a foreign agent
made the corrupt payment. In this situation, the DOJ or SEC can rarely obtain any
form of jurisdiction over the agent and, therefore, cannot question him as to his motives.
See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text. It is also more likely that the issuer or
domestic concern involved had no actual knowledge of the agent's payments. Under these
circumstances an objective standard of constructive knowledge, constituting mere negli-
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These ambiguities are perhaps the clearest evidence that the FCPA is
a very poorly drafted piece of legislation. The interpretational problems
that the FCPA creates have caused many corporations to be particularly
wary about conducting transactions overseas.
The FCPA specifically prohibits bribes made by United States entities-issuers or domestic concerns-to foreign officials. Most industrialized nations, as well as many of the lesser-developed countries, forbid
bribes to their own public officials but remain silent as to foreign bribery.94 These countries, rejecting the United States initiative, have not
enacted similar legislation despite the expectations of Congress.95 Indeed,
why should they? The FCPA is a major export incentive for every foreign business. Many foreign governments, if they do not implicitly encourage bribery by the nonenforcement of their domestic antibribery
laws, at the very least do not discourage foreign payoffs by their corporations. Overseas competitors thus have no real legal restraints imposed on
them by their governments. The United States alone polices the competitive tactics that its domestic corporations use abroad. This puts United
States companies at a distinct disadvantage in doing business with foreign entities. In many nations, foreign entities not only accept bribes as a
business practice but expect payment before they will complete any
transaction. 8
Accurate measurements of the effects of the FCPA are difficult to ob-

gence, may in fact be necessary if enforcement is to be at all effective.
94. For a compilation of foreign statutes that forbid domestic bribery, see Y. KUGEL,
J. CARRO & N. COHEN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS ETHICS (1981). The
FCPA is unique as a law that forbids foreign bribery. See Business Without Bribes,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 1979, at 63.
95. Those who enacted the FCPA believed that if the United States took a moral
stance in business, backed by its economic power, the rest of the world would naturally
follow suit. G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 122. They also presupposed
that the United States would maintain its position of economic hegemony through its
superior technology and competitive technique. Id. Unfortunately, these assumptions
have proved false. The rest of the world not only has failed to enact similar legislation,
but it lacks any incentive whatsoever to do so. Furthermore, the period of United States
economic hegemony may well be ending. "In short, the rest of the world does not agree
with us, and we do not have the wherewithal-economic, diplomatic, or moral-to impose our view in lieu of theirs." Id. at 123; see 1 THE PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL,
THE EXPORT IMPERATIVE: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 29 (1980) [hereinafter THE
EXPORT IMPERATIVE].
96. G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 122-23; Big Profits in Big Bribery, TIME, Mar. 19, 1981, at 58-67; Bribery: A Shocker in U.S., But a Tradition Overseas, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 12, 1976, at 33-34; Coping With the New Rules

of Conduct, Bus. WK., Oct. 10, 1977, at 76; Why Americans Pay Bribes to Do Business
Abroad, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 2, 1975, at 57-58.
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tain, 7 yet empirical evidence suggests that the Act has had a deleterious
impact on United States business abroad.9 8 First, United States companies are turning down requests for payoffs and, consequently, are losing
deals.99 Indeed, Congress knowingly sacrificed increased sales abroad by
its conscious decision that business obtainable only by bribery would be
lost, in order to maintain the integrity of United States corporations. The
Act is achieving precisely this purpose. Second, the Act is causing corporations to be overcautious and turn down legitimate business opportunities because they are unsure whether a proposed transaction will violate
the FCPA. 0 0 Again, this problem hearkens back to the inherent weaknesses and ambiguities found in the Act.
2. The Accounting Provisions
The accounting provisions of the FCPA also reflect the haste with
which Congress drafted and passed the Act. Interpretive debate centers
on the terms "in reasonable detail," 10 1 "accurately and fairly,"1 02 "interThe major
nal accounting controls"10 and "reasonable assurances."'
fault in these provisions is the absence of a materiality standard. 5 The

97. See Taxation of American Workers Overseas and the Foreign CorruptPractices
Act Are Trade Disincentives That Cost U.S. Jobs and Exports, 126 CONG. REC. 18,60102 (1980) (remarks of Mr. Chafee); GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 14; THE EXPORT
IMPERATIVE, supra note 95, at 17-18, 90-92; Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 554-55.
98. GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 14-17; see Sweeney, The SEC Interpretiveand
Enforcement Program Under the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 273, 273-74
(1982); Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 554; Comment, FCPA: Curse or Cure?, supra
note 43, at 427; Comment, Amending the FCPA, supra note 13, at 1749. Contra Wade,
supra note 4, at 260-61 (many claim the FCPA has caused a loss of business, but such
critics fail to produce data needed to assess extent of losses).
99. See Bader & Shaw, supra note 69, at 628; Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 554;
Note, The Criminalizationof American ExtraterritorialBribery: The Effect of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 645, 659 (1981)
[hereinafter Note, Criminalization of American Bribery]; Vicker, U.S. Firms Lose
Ground in Mideast, Wall St. J., July 2, 1980, at 19, col. 2; U.S. Firms Say '77 Ban on
Foreign Payoffs Hurts Overseas Sales, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1979, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter
Ban Hurts Overseas Sales]; Butterfield, U.S. Law Against Bribes Blamed for Millions
in Lost Sales in Asia, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at Al, col. 5.
100. Evidence of this phenomenon is mostly empirical or speculative. See Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 563; Vicker, supra note 99, at 19, col. 2; Ban Hurts Overseas
Sales, supra note 99, at 1, col. 6; Butterfield, supra note 99, at Al, col. 5.
101. FCPA § 102(b)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1982).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 102(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (1982).
104. Id.
105. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 19, 25-31; Brock, supra note 16, at 1088.
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FCPA also lacks any explanation of what constitutes "reasonable detail"
in recording transactions or "reasonable assurances" that all transactions
are authorized, conform to GAAP and accurately reflect the true assets
of the company. 0 6 Furthermore, these disclosure requirements are extremely burdensome,107 particularly for smaller companies, and are not
cost-effective. 0 Finally, they apply to every issuer subject to the 1934
Act reporting requirements, even those with no overseas business.109 The
scope of the Act may, therefore, be excessive.11 0

The SEC intentionally refused to recommend a materiality standard for the Act. In its
opinion, materiality was too narrow an index and would not be certain of covering every
situation. For example, a $200 payment may be material if made by a small company,
yet immaterial if paid by a conglomerate. By the same token, a payment of $20,000 may
be immaterial to a conglomerate even if the conglomerate made the payment with an
intent to influence a foreign official. The appropriate test should be one of reasonableness, which would allow flexibility in responding to particular facts and circumstances.
Address of Harold M. Williams, Chm., SEC, to the SEC Developments Conference of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Jan. 13, 1981, reprinted in 46
Fed. Reg. 11,544, 11,546 (1981). The SEC did not believe that negligent errors would
violate the Act. "Neither its text and legislative history nor its purposes suggest that
occasional inadvertent errors were the kind of problem that Congress sought to remedy in
passing the Act." Id. at 11,547.
106. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 20-22.
107. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 13-14; Comment, FCPA: Curse or Cure?,
supra note 43, at 85.
108. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
109. The Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Hearings on
S. 414 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. and Monetary Pol'y and the Subcomm. on
Secs. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urb. Aff., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
(statements of Michael A. Samuels, Vice-President, International, Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and of William Blasier, Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs.)
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 414]; S. REP., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note
5, at 7, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4105; Atkeson, supra
note 7, at 704; Goebel, supra note 2, at 30; Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future,
supra note 2, at 405, 416. The SEC saw these disclosure requirements as a necessary
part of their efforts to prevent the deception of unwary investors by those corporations
that would attempt to conceal their slush funds. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text. Accordingly, the drafters of the Act added the accounting provisions to section 13(b)
of the 1934 Act in order to strengthen the accuracy of corporate books and records and
the reliability of the audit process and to enhance public confidence in the securities
markets by assuring that corporate recordkeeping is honest. S. REP., FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRAcTIcES, supra note 5, at 7, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
at 4105.
110. See Hearingson S. 414, supra note 109 (statements of John T. Subak, Group
Vice-President & Gen. Counsel, Rohm & Haas Co.; Michael A. Samuels, Vice-President, International, Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and William Blasier,
Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs.); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, Hous. & URB.
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Most of the Act consists of ambiguities such as these, which make
transacting business abroad exceedingly difficult even for American companies that fully intend to be ethical in their dealings. Many congressmen have recognized the need for clarification in the FCPA and have
either authorized or sponsored bills to amend the Act."' These proposed
amendments demonstrate that Congress is attempting to aid American
businesses abroad yet still maintain the ethical position that the FCPA
adopted.
C.

Proposed Amendments to the Act

Congressmen have proposed bills to amend the FCPA almost continually since 1980. No fewer than twelve bills to that effect have been introduced in Congress, five of which appeared during 1986 and 1987."12
1. Past Efforts at Amendments
The Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, Senate Bill S. 708, was the first bill that gained any momentum along the
path to amend the FCPA.1 3 The Bill would have altered significantly

ACT, S. REP. No.
209, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter S. REP., BUSINESS ACCOUNTING ACT].
111. See 131 CONG. REC. S1298-1301 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985) (statements of Senators Heinz, Chaffee, Garn and D'Amato sponsoring bill to amend FCPA); 129 CONG.
REC. El127-28 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1983) (same); 129 CONG. REC. S980-83 (daily ed.
Feb. 3, 1983) (same).
112. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter H.R. 3]; Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1986, H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 701
(1986) [hereinafter H.R. 4800]; Export Enhancement Act of 1986, H.R. 4708, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 402 (1986) [hereinafter H.R. 4708]; Foreign Trade Practices Act of
1986, H.R. 4389, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter H.R. 4389]; Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S. 430, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 131 CONG.
REc. S1299-1301 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985) [hereinafter S. 430]; Trade Partnership Act of
1985, H.R. 3522, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter H.R. 3522]; Business Practices and Records Act of 1983, S. 414, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 129 CONG. REC.
S981-83 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983) [hereinafter S. 414]; H.R. 2754, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), 129 CONG. REC. H2369 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1983) [hereinafter H.R. 2754]; H.R.
2157, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 129 CONG. REC. E1127 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1983)
[hereinafter H.R. 2157]; H.R. 2530, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 708, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter S. 708]; S. 2763, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), 126 CONG.
REC. S12484 (daily ed. May 28, 1980) [hereinafter S. 2763]. H.R. 2754 was the companion bill to S. 414; H.R. 2530 was the companion bill to S. 414; H.R. 2530 was the
companion to S. 708; S. 2763 was the forerunnner to S. 708. None of these bills received
much legislative consideration.
113. S. 708, supra note 112.
AFF., BUSINESS ACCOUNTING AND FOREIGN TRADE SIMPLIFICATION
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both the accounting and the antibribery provisions of the Act.
S. 708 would have amended the accounting provisions of the Act by
combining its internal accounting controls and recordkeeping requirements. The Bill would have defined "reasonable detail" and "reasonable
assurances" in terms of a "level ... as would satisfy prudent individuals
in the conduct of their own affairs, having in mind a comparison between benefits to be obtained and costs to be incurred in obtaining such
benefits."" 4 S. 708 was, therefore, the first proposal to introduce a cost/
benefit analysis to the Act. The Bill would have eliminated criminal liability for the failure to institute a system of internal accounting controls
and would have imposed civil liability only if the issuer could not show a
good faith attempt to comply with that requirement. 1 S. 708 would
have subjected all persons to civil and criminal penalties for knowingly
circumventing the accounting controls requirements. 1 ' Finally, S. 708
would have clarified the liability of a parent corporation for the failure
of a subsidiary to comply with the accounting requirements.'1
The drafters of S. 708 attempted to amend the antibribery provisions
of the FCPA. As a cosmetic alteration, they would have changed the title
of the Act to the Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification
Act' in order to eliminate the negative implications of the term "Foreign Corrupt Practices." ' The Bill would have repealed section 103 of
the Act entirely, thus vesting all civil and criminal enforcement authority
for the antibribery provisions in the DOJ. 20 S. 708 also would have
eliminated the third category of persons to whom payments are forbidden, namely, any person to whom a payment is made by a payor who
has "reason to know" that the payment will end up with a foreign official or political party. The Bill would have replaced the "reason to
know" language with the phrase "direct or authorize, expressly or by a
21
course of conduct.'
S. 708 specifically would have excluded five types of payments from
the prohibitions of the Act: (1) "any facilitating or expediting pay-

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. § 6.
Id. § 4(b).

Id.
Id.

118. Id. § 3.
119. 129 CONG. REC. S980 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983) (statement of Mr. Chafee);
Brennan, supra note 55, at 66; Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 578; Note, Criminalization of American Bribery, supra note 99, at 667.
120. S. 708, supra note 112, § 5(a)(1).
121. Id. § 5(b).
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ment;"1 22 (2) "any payment ... lawful under the law and regulations of
the foreign official's country;"1' 2 s (3) any "courtesy" or "token of regard
or esteem; ' 1 24 (4) "any expenditures, including travel and lodging expenses, associated with the selling or purchasing of goods or services;"1 2 5
and (5) "any ordinary expenditures, including travel and lodging ex1 26
penses, associated with the performance of a contract."
S. 708 also would have broadened the powers of the Attorney General
and the DOJ in civil investigations, granting them the power to seek
injunctions, subpoena witnesses and evidence and to make "such rules
. . . as may be necessary. . . to implement the provisions of this subsection."1 ' The Bill would have made the Act the sole criminal prosecution
device for illegal foreign payments. 2 8 It would have required the establishment of guidelines for compliance with the Act and the creation of
review procedures to provide responses to specific inquiries about enforcement intentions. 2 S. 708 would have excluded from the Freedom
of Information Act1 30 (FOIA) all information revealed to the DOJ in
connection with such a request. Finally, S. 708 would have encouraged
the President to pursue actively an international agreement on illicit foreign payments.13 1
The Senate passed S. 708 on November 23, 1981,132 but the Bill failed
to pass in the House before the end of the session. The Bill was reintroduced in 1983 as S. 414, which was substantively identical to S. 708."3'
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs agreed
to report S. 414 on May 25, 1983, but the Senate took no further action
on the Bill. 3
Both S. 708 and S. 414 were criticized extensively. Both would have
replaced the "reason to know" language of the Act with "direct or au-

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.

128. Id. § 7.
129.
130.
131.

Id. § 8.

Id.
Id.

132. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, Hous. & URB. AFF., BUSINESS ACCOUNTING AND FOREIGN TRADE SIMPLIFICATION ACT, S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1986) [hereinafter S. REP., BAFTSA]; 127 CONG. REC. 28,810, 28,824 (1981).

133. See S. 414, supra note 112; S. REP., BAFTSA, supra note 132, at 1; compare
S. 708, supra note 112, with S. 414, supra note 112.
134. S. REP., BAFTSA, supra note 132, at 2.
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thorize, expressly or by a course of conduct" language, in order to clarify
the potential liability of a corporation for the acts of a third party. Unfortunately, the new language was equally susceptible to ambiguous construction. 3 5 One could interpret "authorize" broadly13 and infer a
"course of conduct" from all the actions taken by a corporation after it
learned of a bribe by its foreign agent, with the danger that liability
might be imputed where the corporation never requested or condoned
137
the payment.
The Bills were also criticized for creating a potentially large area for
abuse in the exemption section. 8s The legislative history of the Act indicated that the specific exception for "facilitating" payments codified Congress' original intent. 39 However, the FCPA itself did not make this
exception clear, and one could infer the existence of the exception only
'
from the definition of a "foreign official." 14
S. 708 and S. 414 would
have improved the statute by defining the exemption in terms of purpose
rather than identity of the payee, 41 yet the failure of the Bills to define a
"routine governmental action"1 42 perpetuated the ambiguity. Also, the
exceptions for "tokens" and "courtesies" should have specified the nomi-

135. See Bader & Shaw, supra note 69, at 634-35; Brennan, supra note 55, at 72;
Roberts & Abbott, supra note 70, at 163-64; Comment, Amending the FCPA, supra
note 13, at 1763-64.
136. See Roberts & Abbott, supra note 70, at 164.
137. See Bader & Shaw, supra note 69, at 634-35; Brennan, supra note 55, at 72;
Roberts & Abbott, supra note 70, at 163-64. In addition, the use of the phrase "in
furtherance of" was extremely awkward grammatically. The entire sentence should have
been replaced to be less cumbersome. See S. 414, supra note 112, § 5(b); S. 708, supra
note 112, § 5(b). The very nature of this type of legislation leads one to expect complicated language. I would suggest a slight rearrangement of the section as follows: "It shall
be unlawful for any domestic concern, or any officer, director or employee, or shareholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern, corruptly to make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to direct or authorize,
expressly or by a course of conduct, a third party to make or offer to make or promise to
make a payment or gift of anything of value to a foreign official for any of the purposes
set forth in subsection (a)" (emphasis added to author's modification).
138. Roberts & Abbott, supra note 70, at 166; Wade, supra note 4, at 270; Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 582.
139. See S. REP., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAcICEs, supra note 5, at 10, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4108.
140. FCPA § 104(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982); see Atchinson, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: A PracticalLook, 53 N.Y. ST. B. J. 342, 344 (1981); Timmeny, supra note 4, at 239; Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 561.
141. See S.414, supra note 112, § 5(b); S.708, supra note 112, § 5(b); Brennan,
supra note 55, at 73; Wade, supra note 4, at 270.
142. See S. 414, supra note 112, §§ 5(b), 6; S.708, supra note 112, §§ 5(b), 6.
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nal character of the gifts; as originally written, they held the potential to
mask large payments that were ostensibly measures of esteem but in reality bribe payments.1 4
The Foreign Trade Practices Act of 1983, H.R. 2157, was another
bill introduced at about the same time as S. 414.44 This bill would have
amended the Export Administration Act of 1979 to include provisions
equivalent to the antibribery provisions of the FCPA. 4 5 A major difference with this proposal was its shift of all authority for the accounting
provisions from the SEC to the Department of Commerce.1 48 The DOJ
would have retained criminal enforcement responsibility. 47 H.R. 2157
also would have granted the Secretary of Commerce the authority to seek
civil injunctions. 148

With regard to the antibribery provisions, the Bill would have permitted the same five types of payments that S. 708 and S. 414 authorized1 49
and would have replaced the "reason to know" language of the Act with
similar "direct or authorize" language.1 5 0 H.R. 2157 differed from S.
708 and S. 414 in that it would have doubled the fines and penalties for
violations of the Act. 51
Other than divesting the SEC of authority, the accounting provisions
of H.R. 2157 were substantially identical to those of S. 708 and S. 414.
H.R. 2157 would have eliminated all criminal penalties for a failure to
institute internal accounting controls and provided a good faith defense
to a charge of civil liability for non-compliance. 52 Finally, it defined
"reasonable detail" and "reasonable assurances" in terms of a "prudent
individual" standard, using a cost/benefit analysis."5 3 Unfortunately, like
the prior bills, H.R. 2157 fell victim to congressional inaction.
The last amendment to the FCPA proposed prior to 1986 was the
Trade Partnership Act of 1985, H.R. 3522.1"4 Title VII of this bill pro143. See Comment, Amending the FCPA, supra note 13, at 1767-68.
144. H.R. 2157, supra note 112.
145. Id. § 2.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 3.
148. Id. § 4.
149. Id. § 2; compare H.R. 2157, supra note 112, § 2 with S. 708, supra note 112,
§ 5(b) and S. 414, supra note 112, § 5(b).
150. H.R. 2157, supra note 112, § 2; compare H.R. 2157, supra note 112, § 2 with
S. 708, supra note 112, § 5(b) and S. 414, supra notes 112, § 5(b).
151. H.R. 2157, supra note 112, § 3; compare H.R. 2157, supra note 112, § 3 with
S. 708, supra note 112, § 5(b) and S. 414, supra note 112, § 5(b).
152. H.R. 2157, supra note 112, § 2.
153. Id.
154. H.R. 3522, supra note 112, introduced in Congress on October 8, 1985, 131
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posed changes that were substantively identical to the provisions of S.
708 and S. 414, except that H.R. 3522 would not have required the
President to pursue an international agreement on illicit foreign payments. 55 Congress never took action on this bill.
Each of the proposed bills suggested essentially the same amendments
to the FCPA. Each bill also expired at various stages of the legislative
process, only to reappear before the second session of the Ninety-ninth
Congress.
2.

Bills Before the Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session

In 1986 Congress considered at least four bills containing amendments
to the FCPA 56 While most of the proposals had been before Congress
at least once, some bills contained new provisions.
S. 430, the Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification
Act, 157 was yet another incarnation of bills S. 708, S. 414, and H.R.
3522.158 S. 430 would have affected both the accounting and the antibribery provisions of the FCPA.
S. 430 would have combined the books and records requirements of
the Act with the internal accounting controls requirements." 9 S. 430
would have eliminated criminal liability for failure to comply with the
accounting provisions and would have provided a defense to civil liability
if there was a good faith attempt at compliance. 60 Civil and criminal
liability would have remained for a knowing failure to comply with or a
knowing attempt to circumvent the accounting provisions."61 In addition,
S. 430 would have clarified the liability of a parent corporation for the
accounting practices of a subsidiary.16 2
The antibribery sections of S. 430 would have repealed the criminal

CONG. REc. H8507 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1985).
155. Compare H.R. 3522, supra note 112, with S. 708, supra note 112, and S. 414,
supra note 112.
156. See H.R. 4800, supra note 112; H.R. 4708, supra note 112; H.R. 4389, supra
note 112; S. 430, supra note 112.
157. S. 430, supra note 112.
158. Compare S. 708, supra note 112, S. 414, supra note 112, and H.R. 3522,
supra note 112, with S. 430, supra note 117. Because S. 430 was identical to its predecessor bills, all criticisms of those bills apply to it. These include criticisms of the "direct
or authorize" language, see supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text, and the scope of
exempted payments, see supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
159. S. 430, supra note 112, § 4.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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prohibitions of the Act relating to illegal foreign payments by issuers. 16 3
Instead it included issuers in its definition of "domestic concern.",," The
Bill would have removed the "reason to know" language of the Act, replacing it with the familiar "direct or authorize" language.1 5 S. 430
listed the same five exemptions for facilitating payments as did S. 414, S.
708 and H.R. 2157:166 payments lawful in the foreign country,1 6 7 payments constituting a gift, courtesy or token of esteem, 6 " expenses associated with the sale or purchase of goods or services"' and ordinary expenses associated with the performance of a contract.1 °
Using a "prudent individual" standard, S. 430 would have included a
cost/benefit analysis in its definitions of "reasonable detail" and "reasonable assurances."17 1 It would have broadened the investigative and subpoena powers of the Attorney General and the DOJ'1 2 and would have
made the Act the exclusive enforcement device for foreign bribery. 3
The Bill would have required the establishment of guidelines for compliance with the FCPA and the institution of review procedures to answer
specific inquiries.17 4 The Bill would have exempted from the FOIA any
information that a company disclosed as part of an inquiry.17 5 Finally, S.
430 would have required the Attorney General and the SEC Commissioner to make yearly reports on all activities under the FCPA. It would
have encouraged the President to seek an international treaty on illegal
foreign payments.1 7
On June 10, 1986, the Senate International Finance and Securities
Subcommittees began hearings on S. 430.17 The Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs agreed to report the Bill on September 17, 1986.78 Congress took no further action before the end of the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. § 5(a)(1).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.

§ 5(b).

§ 6.
§ 5.
§ 7.
§ 8.
§ 9.
S. REP., BAFTSA, supra note 132, at 2.
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session . 79
The Foreign Trade Practices Act of 1986, H.R. 4389,180 was introduced on March 12, 1986. This bill had roots in H.R. 2157;'"' however,
it differed from that bill in several distinct ways. Like H.R. 2157, H.R.
4389 would have amended the Export Administration Act of 1979 by
adding to it antibribery provisions similar to those in the FCPA, and it
would have vested civil enforcement authority with the Department of
Commerce 8 2 rather than the SEC. However, H.R. 4389 varied from
H.R. 2157 in that it would have omitted the accounting provisions of the
Act entirely. It spoke instead in terms of prohibiting "U.S. persons"
from making illegal payments and would have included both issuers and
domestic concerns, as found in the FCPA, in its definition of "United
States persons."' 8 3
H.R. 4389 would have eliminated the "reason to know" language of
the Act, using instead the phrase "with knowledge that a third party"
will make a payment. This variation reflected the dissatisfaction with the
"direct or authorize" amendments found in previous bills and would
have clarified the situations in which a corporation could expect to be
liable for the acts of an agent.
H.R. 4389 included only two exemptions from the prohibitions of the
Act: (1) payments made to secure performance of routine governmental
actions,' 8" and (2) any payment lawful in the country involved.18 5 This,
too, was an improvement on the exceptions in previous bills because it
would have narrowed the scope of permitted payments, thus decreasing
the potential for abuses. However, H.R. 4389 did not go quite far
enough in this area because it did not define a "routine governmental
action;" it only stated that it was not "an action to award business to any
United States person."18
Other than the provisions above, H.R. 4389 made no new proposals.
The Bill would have required the establishment of guidelines for compli-

179. The Bill did not reappear in 1987. If no amendment is signed into law this
year, it seems likely that a form of S. 430 will be reintroduced at a later date.
180. H.R. 4389, supra note 112, introduced in Congress on March 12, 1986, 132
CONG. REc. H1093 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1986).
181. Compare H.R. 4389, supra note 112, with H.R. 2157, supra note 112.
182. Compare H.R. 4389, supra note 112, §§ 2-3 with H.R. 2157, supra note 112,

§ 2.
183. H.R. 4389, supra note 112, § 3.
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Id.
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ance with the Act and the institution of review procedures.11 7 It would

have doubled the penalties and fines for violations of the Act.""8 H.R.
4389 would have given the Secretary of Commerce power to seek civil
injunctions"8 9 and also would have required the Secretary to make an
annual review of the impact of the Act on export activities.1 9 0 Finally,
the Bill would have encouraged the President to seek an international
agreement on the problem of foreign bribery." 1 The Economic Policy
Subcommittee of the House held hearings on H.R. 4389 on April 16,
1986.192 Congress subsequently adopted it into H.R. 4800, the Trade
and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1986.19'
The Export Enhancement Act of 1986, H.R. 4708,"9 introduced on
April 30, 1986, contained a section that would have amended the FCPA.
The House Committees on Agriculture, Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, Energy and Commerce, and the Judiciary discharged the Bill on
May 9, 1986.195 The provisions of the section that would have amended
the FCPA were essentially the same as section 701 of H.R. 4800.
Section 701 of H.R. 4800 did not disturb the accounting provisions of
the Act."9 ' The Bill would have retained the Act's dichotomy with respect to separate prohibited payments provisions for both issuers and domestic concerns.' 9 7 Section 701 also would have kept the original structure of the Act in forbidding payments to foreign officials, foreign
political parties or any third person. 9 8 However, the provision would
have eliminated the "reason to know" language of this last part, replacing it with "while knowing or recklessly disregarding""9 9 the fact that a
payment would ultimately reach a foreign official or political party.
H.R. 4800 would have instituted several defenses to charges of violat-

187. Id.
188. Id. § 4.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 7.
191. Id. § 8.
192. See HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF., EXPORT
H.R. REP. No. 580, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986).

193.

LEGISLATIVE REPORT

ENHANCEMENT

ACT OF 1986,

No. 13, 1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Reporter (Bus.

L. Inc.) at 13-01 (July 1, 1986) [hereinafter FCPA Rep.].
194. H.R. 4708, supra note 112, introduced in Congress on April 30, 1986, 132
CONG. REC. H2282 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1986).
195. H.R. 4708, supra note 112, preamble; 132 CONG. REc. H587 (daily ed. May
9, 1986).
196. See H.R. 4800, supra note 112, § 701.
197. Id. § 701(a), (c).
198. Id.
199. Id.
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ing the Act. One of these was a due diligence defense.20 0 An issuer or
domestic concern would not have been held vicariously liable for the offense of an employee if the issuer or domestic concern "established procedures which can reasonably be expected to prevent and detect, insofar
as practicable, any such violation by such employee or agent"2" 1 and if a
senior official with supervisory capacity over the employee "used due diligence to prevent the commission of the offense. '20 2 The issuer or domestic concern would have had the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence.2 0 3
Defenses to charges of direct violations by an issuer or domestic concern would have required proof that the payment was made to secure
20 4
performance of a "routine governmental action by a foreign official")
or that the payment was "expressly permitted under any law or regulation of the government of the country involved."2 05
H.R. 4800 explicitly defined the terms that it would have used to establish liability. A "routine governmental action" was an action "ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official," 206 including processing papers, loading and unloading cargo and scheduling inspections, but
specifically excluding "any decision by a foreign official on the question
of whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue
business with a particular party. ' 207 H.R. 4800 defined "knowing" as
being "aware or substantially certain, "1208 or being "aware of a high
probability, which [the person] consciously disregards, in order to avoid
awareness or substantial certainty, and does not have an actual belief2 0to
the contrary, that a third party will offer . . . anything of value. D
Under H.R. 4800, "recklessly disregarding" meant being "aware of a
substantial risk"21 0 that a third party would make a payment, but disre-'
garding that risk. Finally, H.R. 4800 defined a "substantial risk" as one
"of such a nature and degree that to disregard it constitutes a substantial
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exer-

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cise in such a situation."2"'
The last major proposal in H.R. 4800 would have changed the fines
and penalties of the Act, depending on which section was violated,2" 2
whether the violation was by an issuer or domestic concern or by another
on its behalf and whether the violation was knowing, willful, or knowing
and willful.21 Other provisions of H.R. 4800 would have required the
institution of guidelines and review procedures, 214 exempted any information disclosed in a review request from the FOIA215 and required the
President to seek an international agreement on illegal foreign
payments.21 6
H.R. 4800 was a tremendous improvement over all prior bills proposed to amend the FOPA. It would have clarified instances of liability
by removing the troublesome "reason to know" language and replacing
it with the defined terms "knowing" and "recklessly disregarding." This
latter term is still somewhat awkward, considering its use of the phrase:
"and does not have an actual belief to the contrary."21' The meaning of
the sentence-that a person "knows" something if he is aware of a high
probability that a third party will make a payment, if he consciously
disregards that probability and if he does not actually believe that a third
party will not make such a payment-is difficult to discern on first reading. Still, this definition of "knowing" and "recklessly disregarding"
would have eliminated past fears, concerning the "reason to know" and
the "direct or authorize" language, that a company would be able to look
the other way to avoid liability or that a company would be liable unless
it constantly monitored its overseas agents.
The "safe harbor" that the due diligence defense created also would
have helped relieve some of the worries that now burden companies by
instructing them how to prevent liability for the acts of renegade agents
or employees. This standard remains somewhat vague because the employee's supervisory official must have "used due diligence to prevent
commission of the offense. ' 21 8 One might raise a question as to whether
a mere good faith attempt to prevent commission of the offense suffices
or whether the company officer must actually prevent the offense. However, within the context of the provision, a good faith attempt should be

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 701(b).
§ 701(a), (c).
§ 701(a), (e).
§ 701(d).
§ 701(a), (c).
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sufficient. Logically, if a company prevents the commission of the offense, no violation of the Act has occurred. The defense works only if an
employee has actually violated the Act, and if the issuer or domestic concern establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, its good faith effort
to prevent the violation.
H.R. 4800 also would have removed the potential for abuse by refusing to exempt any payments from the prohibitions of the Act. Rather, it
would have permitted a company to raise as a defense the fact that a
payment was to secure a routine governmental action or that a payment
was lawful in the foreign country where made. The scope of the facilitating payments defense would have been quite narrow: the Bill defines
routine governmental action to show not only what it is but also what it
is not. This definition would have made it relatively easy to determine
which payments would support the defense. The defense for payments
that are lawful where made would also have been simple to establish by
reference to the laws or regulations of that country.
On the whole, the improvements that H.R. 4800 would have made to
the FCPA were quite valuable and worthy of passage. Unfortunately,
they were part of the 1986 House omnibus trade package. Although the
House passed this Bill on May 22, 1986, and referred it to the Senate on
June 2, 1986,219 it too died with the end of the Ninety-Ninth Congress.
3.

The 1987 Trade Bills

The Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987,
H.R. 3," '2introduced in Congress on January 6, 1987, and passed by
the full'House on April 30, 1987,221 contained essentially the same text
as H.R. 4800.222 Section 352 of H.R. 3 would maintain the present accounting provisions of the FCPA while clarifying ambiguities in the antibribery provisions. It would create a new standard of liability defined
in terms of actual knowledge or reckless disregard of violations of the
Act.2 23 H.R. 3 would also create defenses to charges of violations, includ-

219.

132

CONG. REC.

S6476 (daily ed. June 2, 1986); 132

CONG. REC.

H3162-

H3225 (daily ed. May 22, 1986).
220. H.R. 3, supra note 112, was introduced in Congress on January 6, 1987, 133
CONG. REc. H101 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987).
221. 133 CONG. REC. H2847, H2981 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1987).
222. See Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1417, 1428 (Nov. 26, 1986). The two bills differed, for the most part, only in regard to the amounts of fines and penalties and when
each would be imposed.
223. H.R. 3, supra note 112, § 352(a)(3).
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ing a "due diligence" defense.224 It would not create specific exemptions
but would define permissible payments according to their purpose and
not according to the proposed recipient.2 25 H.R. 3 would authorize the
institution of guidelines and review procedures2 and would exempt any
information disclosed in a review request from the FOIA.227 Unlike previous bills, H.R. 3 would permit a request to be withdrawn prior to the
issuance of an opinion. Such a request would then be without any force
8
or effect.

22

The Senate companion to H.R. 3, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, S. 1420, resembles H.R. 3 in most respects. Like
H.R. 3, S. 1420 would establish various defenses to charges of violations.
It too would define permissible payments in terms of purpose rather
than in terms of the recipient. It differs from H.R. 3, however, in that it
would replace the "reason to know" language of the FCPA with the
"directs or authorizes" language previously seen in S. 708, S. 414, H.R.
2157, H.R. 3522 and S. 430. As discussed above, this language is open
to ambiguous construction. From the standpoint of amending the FCPA,
the original text of H.R. 3 would be preferable to that of S. 1420. Nevertheless, the Senate passed S. 1420 on July 21, 1987.221
No further action has been taken on the trade bill or on the FCPA
during this session of Congress. One can only hope that FCPA proposals
similar to those in H.R. 3 and previous bills will continue to be introduced in the future.230

IV.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REVIEW PROCEDURES

The FCPA originally contained no guidelines to assist in the interpretation of its provisions. The DOJ did not want to provide companies

224. Id. § 352(c).
225. Id.
226. Id. § 352(d)-(e).
227. Id. § 352(e).
228. Id. § 352(e)(3).
229. 133 CONG. REc. S10249, S10372 (daily ed. July 21, 1987). The Senate passed
the bill as H.R. 3 but struck all material appearing after the enacting clause and inserted
the text of S. 1420, as amended. Id. For a comparison of H.R. 3 and S. 1420, see
International Division Staff, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Omnibus Trade Legislation:
The House-Senate Conference 46 (Aug. 18, 1987).
230. Amendment of the Act this year is inextricably tied to enactment of the 1987
Omnibus Trade Bill, which President Reagan had not signed as of November 1987.
Whether the President will sign the Bill before this session of Congress ends is uncertain
and will depend on the pressure he receives regarding the Bill's protectionist attitude
toward American trade, and not on the merits of the FCPA amendment.
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with a blueprint for making a bribe without risking prosecution 23' and
so refused to issue guidelines. Both the DOJ and the SEC believed that
the ambiguities of the Act were desirable for deterrence 23 2 and that clari2 3
fications would provide incentives to circumvent the Act's prohibitions. 1
A.

Review Procedures

The DOJ did eventually establish a review procedure2 34 and a statement of enforcement priorities under the FCPA.2 35 The purpose of such
a review is to provide guidance as to the application of the FCPA's antibribery provisions.'"
1. Circumstances for Review
Any party to a proposed transaction may request a review. 237 That
party must provide, in specific detail, all information relevant and material to the proposed conduct.238 An appropriate senior official with "operational responsibility"23 for the transaction must then verify all the
231.

See Atchinson, supra note 140, at 345; Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 563;

Note, Criminalizationof American Bribery, supra note 99, at 654; Landauer, U.S. Will
Clarify Statute on Corrupt Acts by American Firms Operating Overseas, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 21, 1979, at 20, col. 2.
232. Note, Criminalization of American Bribery, supra note 99, at 654-55;
Landauer, supra note 231, at 20, col. 2.
233. Note, Criminalization of American Bribery, supra note 99, at 654-55.
234. The DOJ suggested to President Carter that review procedures, instead of
guidelines, might be desirable. President Carter then requested the establishment of such
procedures. See Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 564; Landauer, Antibribery Law Uncer-

tainties Persist,Despite President'sCallfor Clarification,Wall St. J., May 30, 1979, at
12, col. 2. President Carter believed that the lack of guidance on the antibribery provisions was itself an export disincentive. See Feller, An Examination of the Accounting
Provisions of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 245, 245 (1982). See generally infra notes 237-250.
235. See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
236. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18 (1985)
[hereinafter FCPA Review Procedure]; See Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 567; Comment, FCPA: Curse or Cure?, supra note 43, at 82.
237. FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(c) (1985); See Witherspoon,
supra note 42, at 566. The DOJ will not entertain requests to review a hypothetical
transaction. The information disclosed must relate to a pending business deal. FCPA
Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(b) (1985).
238. FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(f) (1985); See Witherspoon,

supra note 42, at 570; Heymann Speech on Enforcement Priorites Under FCPA, Legal
Times of Wash., Nov. 12, 1979, at 23, col. 1 [hereinafter Heymann, Legal Times of
Wash.].
239. FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(f) (1985).
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information in the request.
The requesting party must also disclose any other information that the
DOJ may require."" Failure to disclose additional data may preclude
the review. Often a company will not wish to disclose certain information because it will then be available to the general public through the
FOIA. The party requesting an FCPA review can ask the DOJ to refrain from making publicly available any information disclosed for the
review.2 " A company must justify this request by showing that the information is exempt from public disclosure as a trade secret, as privileged and confidential information, or as information falling under another FOIA exemption. 2 The DOJ honors such requests whenever
possible; however, it will always issue a release describing the general
nature of both the transaction and the identity of the parties involved. 4 3
2.

Options of the DOJ on Receipt of Request

The DOJ can take any one of several steps once it receives a review
request. First, the DOJ has discretion to refuse a request. 244 If the DOJ
agrees to review a transaction, it must make reasonable efforts to respond within thirty days.24 5 If it needs additional information to examine
the proposal fully, the DOJ may take another thirty days beyond the
receipt of that data to respond.24 8
After this initial period, the DOJ has several options: it can decline to
state its present enforcement intentions; 247 it can declare its intention to
take no action with respect to the conduct; it can state that it will prosecute if such a transaction occurs; 248 and finally, it can take any other
action it deems appropriate, including further investigation, with respect
to any part of the transaction. 24 9' This action is not limited to enforce-

240. Id. § 50.18(g).
241. Id. § 50.18(i)(1); see Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 569; Note, Criminalization of American Bribery, supra note 99, at 567; Heymann, Legal Times of Wash.,
supra note 238, at 23, col. 1.
242. FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(o)(1) (1985).

243. Id. § 50.18(o)(2).
244. Id. § 50.18(d).
245. Id. § 50.18(i); see Heymann, Legal Times of Wash., supra note 238, at 23, col.
1.
246. FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(i) (1985).
247. Id. § 50.18(h) (1985); see Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 566.
248. FOPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(h) (1985); see Witherspoon,
supra note 42, at 566.
249. FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(h) (1985); see Witherspoon,
supra note 42, at 566.
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ment proceedings under the FCPA but may involve any statute that the
250
DOJ believes has been violated.
3.

Review Priorities

The DOJ considers certain conduct to be particularly egregious. The
likelihood of prosecution increases when: (1) an American company
bribes a foreign official in a market where the only competitors are
American; (2) an American company bribes a foreign official in a market
where the only corrupt competitors are American; (3) an American company bribes an official of a foreign government that is attempting to
eliminate bribery; (4) the bribe involves a foreign cabinet officer or other
high-ranking official; (5) the bribe involves a senior management official
of the offending company; or (6) the offending corporation has not taken
diligent measures to monitor its officers and employees, with the result
that any officer or employee has bribed a foreign official.251 The DOJ
also weighs other factors such as the size of the payment, the size of the
transaction that the payment would affect and any prior history of corrupt payments that the offender has made. The absence of any of this
conduct in a transaction or the presence of good faith efforts by the company to monitor its employees 252 does not mean the DOJ will decline to
prosecute any given business arrangement. 253 The DOJ has merely outlined those situations that it considers to be the most egregious and most
urgently requiring enforcement action.2 54
4.

Effects of the Review

The DOJ permits only limited reliance on one of its review proceedings.255 Only parties who joined in making the request may rely on the

250.

For example, the DOJ may decide to bring charges for mail or wire fraud

violations. See White Collar Crime: Third Annual Survey of Law, 22 Am.

CRIM.

L.

REv. 279, 515 (1985) [hereinafter White Collar Crime]; FCPA and Questionable Payments, supra note 42, at 628 (statement of Timothy Atkeson, Chm., Comm. on Mul-

tinat'l Corps).
251. Note, Criminalizationof American Bribery, supra note 99, at 656; Heymann,
Legal Times of Wash., supra note 238, at 25, cols. 2-4.
252. Note, Criminalizationof American Bribery, supra note 99, at 656; Heymann,
Legal Times of Wash., supra note 238, at 25, col. 3.
253. See Heymann, Legal Times of Wash., supra note 238, at 25, col. 4.
254. See id. at 25, cols. 1, 4; ef. Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 565 (list of factors
given priority for possible enforcement actions); Note, Criminalization of American
Bribery, supra note 99, at 656 (list of factors that increase likelihood of prosecution).
255.

Cf Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 569 (review gives limited guidance).
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declaration of enforcement intent.256 Further, those parties can rely only
on the DOJ's written statement,25 and only to the extent that the disclosure made in the original request continues to reflect accurately the circumstances of the transaction. 5 8
The review has perhaps more nonbinding effects than binding ones. It
has no application to parties who did not join in the review request. 259
This is equally true for nonrequesting parties and for complete strangers
to a transaction. The scope of the review is limited to the antibribery
provisions of the Act,26 ° thereby excluding any consideration of a company's accounting methods or internal controls. Finally, the DOJ review
is not binding on any other government agency or on the obligations of a
party to that agency, 26 1 although the SEC has declared that it will con262
sider the DOJ review as binding.
B.

Results of Review Procedures

As of the fall of 1986, only eighteen companies had submitted requests
since the DOJ instituted the review procedures in 1980. These proposed
transactions, which have caused concerned companies to seek reassurances, have involved contractual arrangements, transactions with foreign
governments, joint ventures and miscellaneous proposals.
1. Discussion of Specific Reviews
Most of the contracts that create anxiety involve agreements to pay
commissions to foreign agents. A company will generally avoid difficulties by requiring adherence to the FCPA on the part of the agent and by
ensuring that the agent personally receives his fee, which must be reasonable, and does not share any portion of it with a foreign official. For
example, in FCPA Review Procedure Release 82-02,263 Shoup, Inc.
256. FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(e) (1985).
257. Id. § 50.180).
258. Id. § 50.18(k); see Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 573.
259. See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
260. FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(1) (1985). Section 102 of the Act,
the accounting provisions, is not limited to foreign transactions but applies to all issuers
subject to the 1934 Act reporting requirements. FCPA § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982).
This area is under the jurisdiction of the SEC. Therefore, for the DOJ to extend the
review procedures to the accounting provisions is inappropriate. See Heymann, supra
note 238, at 21, cols. 3-4.
261. FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(l)-(m) (1985).
262. See infra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
263. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 82-02, Feb. 18, 1982 [hereinafter FCPA Rev.
Proc. Release], reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 716 (Oct. 18, 1982).
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(Shoup) had an agreement to sell voting machines to the Federal Election Commission of Nigeria (Fedeco). Fedeco's agent, Mr. Ogirri, was a
temporary clerk in the Information Section of the Nigerian Consulate in
the United States. Ogirri represented that he had not used his influence
to obtain the contract for Shoup, that he had no connection with Fedeco
and that his finder's fee was only 1% of the aggregate amount to be paid
to Shoup by Nigeria and other specified West African countries over a
ten year period. Further, Ogirri represented that his duties at the Consulate were ministerial and that the Nigerian Government did not consider
him a civil servant. Both Shoup and Ogirri represented that Shoup
would make no payments to foreign officials (other than Ogirri), that
they would evaluate the relationship every six months to determine if the
FCPA had been violated and that any violation would render the contract void.2 6

FCPA Review Procedure Release 82-4 concerned the Thompson &
Green Machinery Co., which employed an agent in connection with the
sale of a generator to a foreign country.2"6 The agency contract stated
that none of the money paid as a commission would go to any third
party, particularly any member of a foreign government. After discovering that the agent's brother was an employee of the government with
whom it had closed the sale, Thompson obtained affidavits from both the
agent and his brother that they would not violate the FCPA. The DOJ
indicated that it would take no enforcement action with respect to this
arrangement.2"'
In another FCPA Review Procedure Release, a California corporation
had requested a review of an agreement that designated an independent
Sudanese communications corporation as its agent for the sale of equipment to commercial and governmental customers in the Sudan.267 The
corporation would make payments directly to the Sudanese corporation,
not to any individual. Neither party expected that any individual Sudanese official would benefit personally from the agreement. The DOJ
stated that it did not intend to take enforcement action with respect to
the arrangement. 2 6
FCPA Review Procedure Release 84-129 provided general informa264. Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 717.
265. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 82-4, Nov. 11, 1982, reprintedin 2 FCPA Rep.
at 718 (Dec. 31, 1982).
266. Id.
267. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 83-01, May 12, 1983, reprinted in 2 FCPA
Rep. at 719 (Oct. 14, 1983).
268. Id.
269. FOPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 84-1, Aug. 16, 1984, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep.
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tion regarding an agency relationship. The principals of the proposed
agent corporation were related to the head of a foreign government, with
one of the principals personally managing that head of state's business
affairs. The American firm indicated that the agent corporation had represented that it would not make any payments to any foreign official to
influence that official's acts. It also represented that none of its officers or
directors would become officials of that government for the duration of
the agency agreement. The agreement would provide that any violation
of the FCPA by the agent corporation would render the contract void ab
initio.2 70
A remark by a foreign agent that a small facilitating payment might
be necessary prompted the review requested in FCPA Review Procedure
Release 84-2.21 An American firm wanted to sell its foreign assets to a
foreign company and then invest in that company. This transaction required foreign government regulatory approval. In its request, the American firm represented that the foreign agent had declared that it had
never made any payments to foreign government officials. The firm represented that it had no knowledge of any payments actually made and
that its employees had discouraged the payment of the gratuity. The firm
also represented that if it learned the foreign company had violated the
FCPA, it would notify the DOJ and responsible foreign authorities. The
firm also retained the right to sever the agency relationship with the
foreign corporation. 272 The DOJ indicated that it had no enforcement
intention with respect to the transaction.27 3
Another review release 27 4 concerned an agreement for services to be
rendered by one company (SGV) to another (Bechtel) in the Philippines.
This particular contract is significant for the representations that Bechtel
and SGV made to ensure compliance with the FCPA. Both parties
stated in the review request that they were familiar with the Act. They
agreed that all payments to SGV would be made by check or bank transfer under a closely supervised set of rules.27 5 SGV represented that no
one connected with it was a foreign official, representative of a political
party or candidate for political office and that it would not take any

at 721
270.
271.
at 722
272.
273.
274.
at 713
275.

(Oct. 31, 1984).
Id.
FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 84-2, Aug. 20, 1984, reprintedin 2 FCPA Rep.
(Oct. 1, 1985).
Id.
Id.
FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 81-1, Nov. 25, 1981, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep.
(Jan. 22, 1982).

Id.
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action to violate the FCPA. SGV further represented that it would obtain an opinion of local counsel to the effect that the contract between
Bechtel and SGV was itself lawful and that all actions taken incidental
to the FCPA were lawful and would not violate Philippine law. Bechtel
represented that it did not desire and would not request any action by
SGV that might violate the FCPA.21 8 SGV agreed in the contract that it
could not assign any of its rights under the contract to a third party
without Bechtel's consent and that it would not obligate Bechtel to a
third party without Bechtel's consent. 2 The parties designed both
clauses to prevent the possibility that a third person would, without
Bechtel's knowledge, commit some act in violation of the FCPA. The
contract contained a "drop-dead" clause that would permit either SGV
or Bechtel to abandon the agreement if either had a good faith belief that
the other had violated or would violate the FCPA.27 8 SGV agreed to
disclose the terms of the contract fully at any time to anyone who Bechtel's general counsel determined had a legitimate reason to know such
information.2 79 The contract set forth various expenses for which Bechtel
could reimburse SGV and the method of disbursement that the companies would follow. Finally, Bechtel listed as one of its representations the
factors it considered in selecting SGV as its consultant. 280 The DOJ
stated that based on all the representations by SGV and Bechtel, it had
no present enforcement intentions with respect to the contract.28 '
Transactions with foreign governments involve similar circumstances
for potential FCPA difficulties. For example, when is it appropriate for
a company to pay for travel expenses of a foreign delegate who is conducting business with the firm? Three releases addressed this type of
problem.2 82
In an effort to promote sales of Missouri products in Mexico, the
Missouri State Department of Agriculture invited Mexican representatives to a series of meetings on agriculture and agricultural products.
The Agriculture Department proposed to pay the reasonable and necessary expenses of the delegation, including meals, hotels, travel and en-

276. Id.
277. Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 714 (Jan. 22, 1982).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 715 (Jan. 22, 1982).
281. Id.
282. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 193-15 [85-1], July 16, 1985, reprinted in 2
FCPA Rep. at 722 (Oct. 1, 1985); FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 83-03, July 26, 1983,
reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 720 (Oct. 14, 1983); FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 82-01,
Jan. 27, 1982, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 716 (Oct. 18, 1982).
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tertainment.28 3 A year later, the Agriculture Department and a Missouri
corporation proposed a similar set of meetings and promotions with a
delegation from Singapore as a means of increasing agricultural sales to
that government. The Agriculture Department and the corporation proposed to pay all the expenses of the delegation.2 " In the fall of 1985,
Atlantic Richfield Corporation (ARCO) submitted to the DOJ a request
for review of its proposed invitation to French industrial finance ministers. The invitation arose out of plans for an ARCO subsidiary to build
a chemical plant in France. The officials would come to Pennsylvania
and Texas to meet with ARCO management and inspect a similar plant.
ARCO intended to pay all the necessary and reasonable expenses that
the delegation inciirred.2" 5
Sales to foreign governments present particular difficulties that overlap
with the types of problems encountered in agency relationships, as the
cases of sales of voting machines to Nigeria" 6 and generators to an unnamed foreign government demonstrate. 7 These situations may also involve some foreign law that requires an agency agreement with a government-controlled entity. A Delaware corporation seeking to do business
with the purchasing agency for the Yugoslav Military found itself in this
position.2" 8 To cover itself, the corporation drafted the agency agreement,
which the parties executed simultaneously with the purchasing agreement, to state that the corporation would pay the agent organization its
commissions directly. None of the parties expected that an individual
government official would benefit from the agreement.28 9
Finally, problems may arise when a company wishes to give a foreign
official a sample of wares during the course of sale negotiations. Review
Release 81-02 addressed this difficulty. 290 The Iowa Beef Packers
planned to give sample packages of beef to Soviet foreign trade ministers
283. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 82-01, Jan. 27, 1982, reprinted in 2 FCPA
Rep. at 716 (Oct. 18, 1982).
284. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 83-03, July 26, 1983, reprinted in 2 FCPA
Rep. at 720 (Oct. 14, 1983).
285. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 193-15 [85-1], July 16, 1985, reprinted in 2
FCPA Rep. at 722 (Oct. 1, 1985).
286. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 82-02, Feb. 18, 1982, reprinted in 2 FCPA
Rep. at 716-17 (Oct. 18, 1982).
287. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 82-4, Nov. 11, 1982, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep.
at 718 (Dec. 31, 1982).
288. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 82-03, Apr. 22, 1982, reprinted in 2 FCPA
Rep. at 718 (Dec. 31, 1982).
289. Id.
290. FOPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 81-02, Dec. 11, 1981, reprinted in 2 FCPA
Rep. at 715 (Jan. 22, 1982).
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to demonstrate the quality of the products. The Iowa Beef Packers
would furnish the packages to the trade ministers solely in their official
capacities and not for their personal use. The DOJ determined that it
would take no enforcement action with respect to this exchange.29 1
Other arrangements presented to the DOJ for review have included
the establishment of a scholarship fund for the adopted children of an
honorary official of a foreign government,2 92 the eligibility of an employee of a foreign subsidiary to run for a minor political office, 293 and
the dual status of a particular person as the chairman of an Arab corporation and as an outside director of a government-related corporation
when the former corporation planned to transact business with the latter.2 9 The DOJ had no enforcement intentions with respect to these
transactions.
2.

General Results

The DOJ has never expressed an intention to prosecute with respect
to any of the eighteen requests submitted. The least favorable response
that the DOJ has issued has been a refusal to state its enforcement intentions. The DOJ declined to review the transaction that was the subject of FCPA Review Procedure Release 80-03, stating that a review was
not appropriate because the parties had submitted only a contract and a
cover letter, and the DOJ could not detect from the submitted materials
2 95
any facts or circumstances that would be cause for alarm.
C.

Effectiveness of the Review Procedures

Companies have not widely used the review procedures. Only eighteen
requests have been made during the seven years that the procedures have
existed, all receiving favorable replies. One may draw two conclusions
from this: either the review procedures are ineffective to the point of
being a "rubber stamp," or the Act does not constrain American business
abroad in the manner originally envisioned.
No corporation would likely announce to the DOJ in a review request
291.
292.
at 711
293.
at 711
294.
at 712
295.
at 712

Id., reprinted in 2 FOPA Rep. at 716.
FOPA Rev. Prop. Release No. 80-01, Oct.
(Jan. 31, 1984).
FOPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 80-02, Oct.
(Jan. 31, 1984).
FOPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 80-04, Oct.
(Jan. 31, 1984).
FOPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 80-03, Oct.
(Jan. 31, 1984).

29, 1980, reprintedin 2 FOPA Rep.
29, 1980, reprintedin 2 FCPA Rep.
29, 1980, reprintedin 2 FOPA Rep.
29, 1980, reprintedin 2 FOPA Rep.
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that it plans a business transaction that it considers illegal. Companies
may be so concerned about disclosing sensitive information to the DOJ
that they will only request a review for conduct that they believe is
safe. 2"' If this is so, the review procedures may be a waste of time. On
the other hand, if corporations have submitted transactions that genuinely cause them concern, the streak of favorable responses may indicate
that the Act's effect is not as restrictive as commentators feared, or that
the Act is far less ambiguous than critics sometimes claim.29 7
1. Possible Criticisms of Review Procedures
The drafters of the review procedures intended them to provide direct
guidance to the parties involved and indirect guidance to the business
community at large. Whether the procedures have achieved this goal is a
matter for debate. Certainly the proposed amendments indicate that congressmen and their business constituents do not believe the present methods are helpful. 298 The DOJ, on the other hand, is convinced that as a
practical matter the FCPA does not create a vague area of potential liability for businesses and that the current review procedures are the simplest and most effective means of guidance available.29
a.

Limited Use as Guidelines

The results of a review request provide little guidance to businesses
because the DOJ limits each review to "the facts and circumstances as
represented by the requestor,"' ' 0 and each review states only the DOJ's
present enforcement intentions. Later developments surrounding the
transaction before it closes may necessitate altering the original arrangement, yet any deviation by the parties from the original proposed conduct would be cause for an enforcement action if the DOJ believed that

296. See Roberts & Abbott, supra note 70, at 162; Witherspoon, supra note 42, at
568.
297. Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 569. Another possible explanation for the
dearth of review requests is that companies are simply using in-house counsel to advise
them on the FCPA consequences of a particular transaction. Interview with Peter B.
Clark, Trial Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Just., in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 8, 1986) [hereinafter Clark Interview].
298. See supra notes 112-219 and accompanying text.
299. Keeney Statement, supra note 83; Clark Interview, supra note 297.
300. FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 80-01, Oct. 29, 1980, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep.
at 711 (Jan. 31, 1984); cf.FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(h) (1985) ("review letter can be relied upon by the requesting party or parties to the extent the disclosure was accurate and complete").

472

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW[

[Vol 20.431

was necessary.3" 1 At the very least, a material change in facts would
require a new review. Circumstances occurring after the transaction is
fixed may give the American parties reason to know that a foreign agent
has made a questionable payment. The company must be prepared to
walk away from the transaction entirely and absorb any losses it
experiences."0 2
Furthermore, because the reviews are not applicable to anyone who
was not a party to the request, they have no precedential value for others
who are creating or structuring similar transactions. A review would
have value for another company only if its problem is the same type as
indicated in a review and the company is capable of doing the same type
transaction.303 The probability of this occurring is not very great.
In fact, the review procedures are not guidelines but disclosure requirements. Because the DOJ will not entertain requests to review a
hypothetical transaction,304 companies must create a transaction first and
then disclose all the particulars of the arrangement. Only at that point
will the DOJ decide whether it will take enforcement action with respect
to the transaction. A major criticism of the present review procedures,
therefore, is that even when companies use them, they produce too much
hesitation and overcautiousness. Nevertheless, the present review procedures do confirm the DOJ's unchanging position that it will not teach
businesses how to commit foreign bribery.
b.

Possibility of Dual Enforcement Actions

A favorable review under the FCPA review procedures does not guarantee that a proposed transaction is absolutely valid under all United
States laws: a favorable review is not a grant of immunity. The review
procedures theoretically do not bind the SEC, which shares enforcement
301. See FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(k) (1985) ("review letter can
be relied upon . . . to the extent the disclosure continues accurately and completely to
reflect circumstances after the date of issuance"); Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 573
(review binding only as to facts disclosed).
302. See Timmeny, supra note 4, at 283; Clark Interview, supra note 297. Most
foreign agency agreements contain "drop dead" clauses, which allow the American company to walk away from a contract if it discovers its foreign agent has violated the
FCPA. Such clauses protect the company from further losses under the law of that foreign country, for example, for breach of a valid agency agreement. Id.
303. This is, in fact, part of the same rationale upon which the DOJ bases its refusal
to formulate FCPA guidelines. A finite number of approved FCPA model transactions
would cause too many companies to try to force their unique fact situations into the
hypothetical role, having a straitjacket effect. See infra notes 305-06 and accompanying
text.
304. FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(b) (1985).
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authority with the DOJ.3 0

5

However, as a general matter, the SEC an-

nounced in August 1980 that it would not start enforcement actions
against businesses that received favorable reviews prior to May 31,
1981.30' The SEC has not issued any subsequent policies except that "as
a matter of prosecutorial discretion"3 7 it will accept DOJ reviews or
enforcement actions under section 103 of the Act."'
A DOJ review is binding only as to the FCPA. 0 American businesses must also worry whether the DOJ or the SEC will bring some
enforcement action under any other United States laws. In theory, the
DOJ is still free to bring a suit against the company for an antitrust
violation, mail fraud, wire fraud or violations of the currency reporting
acts."' o
In actuality, the likelihood of prosecution for an antitrust violation is
slim because the jurisdictional overlap of the two laws is not great.3"
Congress enacted the mail and wire fraud statutes to apply to crimes
within the United States and not abroad. The DOJ is unlikely to use
them in an FCPA prosecution. Some commentators feel that the DOJ
should not penalize a corporation for its openness in making the disclosures in the review request. However, from a layman's point of view, it
is just and proper that a corporation should not be immunized from all
possible prosecutions merely because it has revealed proposed conduct in
a review request. If the corporation has violated another law, such as the
currency reporting statute, the United States should prosecute it for the
offense.
c. The Need for FCPA Guidelines
A widespread belief exists, evidenced by the proposed amendments to
the FCPA, 12 that the ambiguities of the Act necessitate some alternate
305. See Heymann, supra note 238, at 21, cols. 3-4; see supra notes 260-61 and
accompanying text.
306. See Note, Criminalizationof American Bribery, supra note 99, at 658.
307. Statement of Commission Policy Concerning Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 45 Fed. Reg. 59001, 59002 (1980).
308. Id.; see Comment, FCPA: Impact and Future, supra note 2, at 425; Note,
Criminalizationof American Bribery, supra note 99, at 658.
309. See Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 573; White Collar Crime, supra note 250,
at 515; supra notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
311. Clark Interview, supra note 297.
312. Specifically, those sections of the proposed bills that would require guidelines or
that would affect the existing review procedures evidence the belief. See H.R. 3, supra
note 112, § 352(d)-(e); H.R. 4800, supra note 112, § 701(c); H.R. 4389, supra note
112, § 3; S. 430, supra note 112, § 8.
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form of direction from the DOJ. This guidance would enable United
States companies to know under what circumstances the DOJ will consider them to have "reason to know" of a corrupt payment or when a
payment is not merely "facilitating."
Perhaps the most practical opinion that the guidelines could provide is
when a payment that is lawful in a foreign country would be illegal in
the United States. 1 ' Factors that the DOJ could consider in making this
decision are the excessiveness of the payment, the nature of the payment
as being particularly reprehensible and the degree of scandal that would
ensue if the company revealed the identity of the bribed official. 31 ' The
DOJ could also officially sanction business structures that it has found
valid, or it could present hypothetical models that it believes to be valid.
It could issue a special release of approved transactions and encourage
other companies to imitate these transactions as closely as possible.
Establishment of FCPA guidelines would not eliminate the review
procedures. Even when corporations have adequate models and information from which to draft lawful transactions, they may want to be assured that certain borderline transactions are in fact valid. Retention of
the review procedures would also benefit the DOJ by enabling it to stay
involved with proposed overseas corporate transactions.
2.

Potential Advantages to Current FCPA Review Procedures

The DOJ does not share the view held by the authors of the various
proposed amendments to the Act that FCPA guidelines are necessary.
Quite the contrary, the DOJ has stated that "[f]rom a commercial as
well as an enforcement point of view, the Department does not believe
that issuing guidelines or precautionary procedures would be
advisable." ' 5

313. Congress has taken a firm moral stance against bribery, yet it still wants United
States firms to be able to compete overseas. An extremely pragmatic suggestion would be
for the DOJ to provide examples of appropriate behavior in each country. Assume that
the DOJ would take the time, once and for all, to investigate (discreetly) acceptable
limits on bribery in different areas. The DOJ could do this by examining the large,
highly developed European and Middle Eastern nations separately and classifying
smaller countries within Southeast Asia, Africa or South America by geographic area.
Assume further that the DOJ then releases its findings: what may be a bribe in West
Germany may not be a bribe in Japan or Cameroon. Of course, this suggestion is totally
infeasible. Barring logistical problems such as how to compile such information, the foreign policy implications of such an effort would be enormous. At the minimum, such an
inquiry would intrude severely into foreign sovereignty matters.
314. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
315. Keeney Statement, supra note 83, at 10.
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According to the DOJ, any attempt even to formulate a set of guidelines in this area would ultimately be impractical for two reasons. First,
if the DOJ presents only a few hypothetical transactions as acceptable
under the FOPA, then American companies will unduly restrict their
business opportunities by trying to fit within the given examples. Second,
if the DOJ attempts to list every possible permutation -companies use in
constructing business transactions, the result will be a voluminous compilation through which a business party must search in order to determine if his fact situation fits one already given. Both these attempts
would straitjacket business dealings and possibly disadvantage American
companies in foreign markets.3 16
Mere dollar limitations on payments to foreign officials serve no useful
purpose: a payment may be very large, yet made with the most innocent
of intentions, or very small, yet made with the most egregious intent. 1
Finally, due process would require that any position that the DOJ takes
in guidelines govern any future criminal actions under the Act,31 even if
mitigating circumstances arise that were not present earlier.
For these reasons, the DOJ believes that guidelines would be more of
a hindrance than a help to the American business community. On the
other hand, the DOJ holds firmly that its review procedure is the least
restrictive method for solving potential difficulties under the FOPA.
While the reviews are not advisory opinions to private attorneys,3 19 they
do state the DOJ's present enforcement intent with regard to particular
circumstances. Because the DOJ handles the reviews on a case-by-case
basis, the DOJ examines each transaction on its merits. In this way, a
company can learn that, under limited conditions, the DOJ will not
prosecute a minor or technical violation of the FCPA."2 °
Furthermore, compliance with the requirements for the review requests is not difficult. The requesting party need only describe all information relevant and material to the proposed transaction. 21 The DOJ
believes that this process "works well and fairly.3a' 2a
At this writing, it does not appear likely that any FOPA guidelines
are forthcoming. The DOJ will not issue guidelines without a congressional mandate. Congressional action on the proposed amendments has

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id.; see also Clark Interview, supra note 297.
Keeney Statement, supra note 83, at 10-11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10; Clark Interview, supra note 297.
FCPA Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(e).
Keeney Statement, supra note 83, at 10.
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halted at various stages of the legislative process. FCPA guidelines are
thus inextricably bound to passage of amendments to the Act. The business community must continue to rely on review releases and the results
of actual prosecutions by the DOJ for assistance in understanding the
FCPA.
V.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER THE

FCPA

To this date, the DOJ and the SEC have brought comparatively few
actions to enforce the antibribery provisions."' 3 Several factors account
for this phenomenon, the predominant one being the heavy burden of
detection placed on these government agencies. 3 2' In many foreign coun323. See Comment, FCPA: Curse or Cure?, supra note 43, at 86; Note, Criminalization of American Bribery, supra note 99, at 646, 664-65; Note, Effective Enforcement
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 561, 569 (1980). [hereinafter
Note, Effective Enforcement]. The actions that the DOJ and SEC have brought will be
discussed infra in part V, sections A and B. There have been more recent reports of
foreign bribery, but none have resulted in formal charges. The investigations of Ashland
Oil started long before the current series of inquiries. Two Congressional subcommittees
studied over $17 million in payments to a former official of Abu Dhabi. See Gerth,
Ashland Payments on Oil Questioned, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1983, at 1, col. 1. Also,
since the fall of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines on February
25, 1986, new information has been uncovered concerning payments by GTE Corp. and
Westinghouse Electric Corp. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1986, at Al, col. 1. The DOJ has
not brought charges on either of these allegations. See Gerth, The Marcos Empire: Gold,
Oil, Land and Cash, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 4., at 18, col. 3.
By contrast, both the DQJ and the the SEC have brought many actions alleging violations of the accounting provisions. The DOJ will use the FCPA accounting rules to
reach other felonies or felons. For example, it will allege FCPA accounting violations to
reach instances of mail fraud or wire fraud, income tax evasion and false SEC filings. See
Information, United States v. Duquette, Crim. No. H-84-64 (D. Conn. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.74-.78 (Apr. 30, 1985); Information, United States v.
Miller, No. CR84-76 (N.D. Ohio filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.72-.73
(Apr. 30, 1985). It will also use the accounting provisions to reach individual defendants.
See Daily Report, Fraud Section, Crim. Div., United States v. Miller, reprinted in 2
FCPA Rep. at 696.72 (April 30, 1985).
The SEC, for its part, will routinely make allegations of FCPA violations-failure to
maintain accurate books and records and failure to devise internal accounting controls-in the various securities actions it brings. In Securities and Exchange Commmission v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 745-51 (N.D. Ga. 1983),
Judge Vining gave a lucid exposition of the accounting provisions, with respect to their
policies, purposes and requirements and SEC actions taken to enforce them. The most
important recent examination of the accounting provisions may be found in In re Tonka
Corp., Release No. 22,448, [1982-1987 Transfer Binder Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,473 (Sept. 24, 1985).
324. See Note, Criminalizationof American Bribery, supra note 99, at 661; Note,
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tries political corruption is accepted as a given fact.3 2 5 Efforts by the
DOJ or SEC to investigate possible illicit payments may offend foreign
officials and harm other United States interests. Also, any vigorous attempts to enforce the Act could lead to unexpected political or public
complications that could cause American companies to lose business
needlessly.3 2 1 Willing recipients of bribes would not be anxious to deal
with United States corporations knowing that any transaction may be
subject to close scrutiny.
Prosecutorial difficulties may often outweigh the benefits of bringing
an enforcement action.3 27 The crime usually occurs on foreign soil, with
the result that the DOJ or SEC cannot easily compel discovery. The
cooperation of foreign individuals or governments is almost always necessary, although it may be difficult or impossible to obtain. 28 Sixth
amendment problems may arise if the DOJ or SEC fails to produce a
foreign witness or evidence at trial.129 Finally, the SEC and particularly
the DOJ are understaffed in this area. 33 0
Thus, for a variety of reasons, the complexities surrounding enforcement of the FCPA have severely limited the number of actions brought
under the antibribery provisions. 331 Nevertheless, the DOJ has com-

Effective Enforcement, supra note 323, at 569.
325. See Note, Criminalizationof American Bribery, supra note 99, at 650-51; Big
Profits in Big Bribery, TIME, Mar. 16, 1981, at 58, 59, 67; Bribery: A Shocker in U.S.,
But a Tradition Overseas, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 12, 1976, at 33, 34; Why
Americans Pay Bribes to Do Business Abroad, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 2,
1975, at 57, 58. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
326. See G. GREANIAS & D. WINDSOR, supra note 2, at 122-23; Coping With the
New Rules of Conduct, Bus. WE., Oct. 10, 1977, at 76. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

327.

Timmeny, InternationalAspects of the Accounting Provisions of the Foreign

Corrupt PracticesAct, in

PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1980, at 205-06 (1980); Note, Criminalization of

American Bribery, supra note 99, at 661-64; Note, Effective Enforcement, supra note
323, at 569-70; Note, FCPA: ExtraterritorialApplication, supra note 55, at 717-18.
328. Timmeny, supra note 327, at 205-06; Maurice, supra note 13, at 490; Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 560; Note, Criminalization of American Bribery, supra note
99, at 661-64; Note, FCPA: ExtraterritorialApplication, supra note 55, at 717-18.
329. Timmeny, supra note 327, at 205-06; Maurice, supra note 13, at 491; FCPA
and Questionable Payments, supra note 42, at 632 (statement of Mark M. Richard,
Chief, Dep't of Just., Crim. Div., Fraud Sec.); Note, Criminalization of American Bribery, supra note 99, at 661-64; Note, Effective Enforcement, supra note 323, at 569-70;

Note, FCPA: ExtraterritorialApplication, supra note 55, at 717-18.
330. Note, Criminalizationof American Bribery, supra note 99, at 663; Note, Effective Enforcement, supra note 323, at 570.
331. There are several other theories as to why so few convictions under the Act
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menced some actions alleging instances of foreign bribery.
A.

Actions to Enjoin Foreign Bribery

Since 1979 the DOJ has brought a total of ten reported actions to
enjoin occurrences of foreign bribery by American companies.3 32 Six of
these cases, known as the "Pemex" cases, involved a conspiracy to make
payments to foreign officials of Petroleos Mexicanos, the Mexican national oil company. 3 s The other four suits involved separate incidents of
33 7
payoffs made in Qatar, 3 3 4 the Cook Islands,3 35 Mexico 8 ' and Nigeria.
United States v. Carvers8" was the first enforcement proceeding that
the DOJ brought to enjoin foreign bribery. The defendants, Roy J.
Carver and R. Eugene Holley, had made a payment of $1,500,000 to Ali
Jaidah, the Director of Petroleum Affairs of Qatar, to obtain an oil
exist. One is that the strong deterrent effect of the FCPA has resulted in fewer bribes.
See Note, Criminalization of American Bribery, supra note 99, at 664. Naturally, the
government would commence fewer enforcement actions. On the other hand, it may be
that certain extremely sophisticated businesses do still bribe foreign officials but in such a
way that detection is virtually impossible. Id. at 665. The scope of the FCPA may also
make it inherently difficult to enforce. Id.
332. United States v. McLean, 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1050 (1985); Information, United States v. Carpenter, Crim. No. 85-353 (D.N.J. filed
n.d.), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.79 (Jan. 1, 1986); Indictment, United States v.
Crawford Enters, Inc., Crim. No. H-82-224 (S.D. Tex. charged Oct. 20, 1982), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.53 (Jan. 31, 1984); Information, United States v. Applied Process Prods. Overseas, Inc., Crim. No. 83-00004 (D.D.C. filed n.d.), reprinted
in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.42 (Jan. 31, 1984); Information, United States v. Ruston Gas
Turbines, Inc., Crim. No. H-82-207 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 22, 1982), reprinted in 2
FCPA Rep. at 696.38 (Jan. 31, 1984); Information, United States v. C.E. Miller Corp.,
No. CR82-788 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept., 1982), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.33 (Jan.
31, 1984); Information, United States v. International Harvester Co., Crim. No 82-244
(S.D. Tex. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.27 (Jan. 31, 1984); Information, United States v. Kenny Int'l Corp., (D.D.C. filed Aug. 2, 1979), reprinted in 2
FCPA Rep. at 649 (Dec. 31, 1982); Complaint for Permanent Injunction, United States
v. Carver, (S.D. Fla. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 645 (Dec. 31, 1982).
333. McLean, 738 F.2d at 655 ; Indictment, Crawford Enters., Inc., reprinted in 2
FCPA Rep. at 696.53; Information, Applied Process, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at
696.42; Information, Ruston Gas, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.38; Information,
C.E. Miller Corp., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.33; Information, International
Harvester, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.27.
334. Complaint, Carver, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 645.
335. Information, Kenny Int'l, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 650.
336. Information, United States v. Silicon Contractors, Inc., Crim. No. 85-251 (E.D.
La. filed June 27, 1985).
337. Information, Carpenter, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.79.
338. Complaint, Carver, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 645.
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drilling concession in that country. 3 9 The defendants' business encountered operational and financial troubles, and they could not comply with
the terms of the concession agreement. The new Director of Petroleum
Affairs told them that they would lose their concession." ° The defendants then contacted the State Department in an effort to find someone
who could help them renegotiate their drilling concession. The defendants met with the United States Ambassador to Qatar, a foreign service
officer, and the Director of Petroleum Affairs, but they could not reach a
new agreement. Unfortunately for Carver, he revealed to the Ambassador that he had already paid $1,500,000 for the original concession. He
then asked, "who do I go see now, how do I get it done?1 341 in reference
to obtaining the new concession and protecting his original investment.
Both the Ambassador and the foreign service officer terminated all fur3 42
ther discussion with Carver.
The DOJ responded by filing a complaint for a permanent injunction. 343 The "use of the mails or other instrumentalities of interstate
commerce" requirement was met because the defendants allegedly flew
to Qatar from an airport in Florida (the airport being the instrumentality of interstate transportation) and made use of wire facilities to have
the payment sent to a Swiss bank account.3 44 A consent order3 41 in
which both defendants agreed to the entry of a permanent injunction
restraining them from any further violations of sections 104(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act settled the complaint. 3 "
which the DOJ
United States v. Kenny International Corp.,
brought later that same year, charged the defendant corporation and its
president, Finbar Kenny, with making a corrupt payment to a foreign
political party in order to retain business. 8 Kenny International had
possessed the exclusive rights to distribute and sell Cook Islands postage
stamps outside that country in exchange for retention of 50 percent of
the proceeds. Only the reelection to office of Sir Albert Henry, then the
Premier of the Cook Islands and Leader of the Cook Islands Party,

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
entered
346.
347.
348.

Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 645-46.
Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 646.
Id.
Id.
Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 645.
Id., reprinted in 2 FOPA Rep. at 645-46.
Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction, United States v. Carver (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 9, 1979), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 647 (Dec. 31, 1982).
Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 648.
Information, Kenny Int'l, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 650.
Id., reprinted in 2 FOPA Rep. at 651.
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could assure Kenny International of the continued existence of the agreement. Sir Albert Henry proposed to transport Cook Islands Party voters
from New Zealand to the Cook Islands to assure victory in the elections.
Sir Albert Henry contacted Kenny and Kenny International and asked
them to subsidize the flight costs for these voters. Kenny and Kenny International agreed even though the subsidy was illegal under Cook Islands law. Sir Albert Henry and Kenny met in Hawaii, where they
agreed that they would deduct the payment to the Cook Islands Party
from the Government's share in the postage stamp proceeds. Pursuant to
this agreement, Kenny and Kenny International paid $NZ337,000 (approximately $US337,000) to the Cook Islands Party.349
The DOJ discovered the scheme after Sir Albert Henry won the election. The DOJ charged Kenny and Kenny International with the corrupt use of a commercial aircraft to make payments to a foreign political
party in order to retain business.3 50 Kenny International pleaded guilty
to the charge, consented to a final judgment permanently enjoining it
from violating section 104 of the FCPA and paid a fine of $50,000."'
Finbar Kenny agreed to appear and plead guilty in the criminal case
brought in the Cook Islands arising from his actions.3" 2 He also consented to a final judgment permanently enjoining him from violating section 104 of the Act, and he agreed to appear voluntarily in the Cook
3 3
Islands to testify at any proceeding relating to the fraudulent election. 0
Finally, Finbar Kenny guaranteed to pay the Government of the Cook
Islands restitution in the amount of $NZ337,000.54
The Pemex cases resulted from a complex conspiracy among a number
of entities to obtain or retain business with Petroleos Mexicanos, the
Mexican state-owned oil company. Crawford Enterprises, Inc. (CEI) instigated the conspiracy, which included Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. (Ruston), the Solar Turbines International Division of International Harvester Co. (Solar), the C.E. Miller Corp. (CEMCO) and Pemex's
subdirectors of purchasing and production. 5 CEI arranged to pay five

349. Offer of Proof, United States v. Kenny Int'l Corp., (D.D.C. filed Aug. 2, 1979),
reprinted in 2 FOPA Rep. at 649-50 (Dec. 31, 1982).
350. Kenny was charged only in the civil injunctive action. Information, Kenny Int'l,
reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 650.
351. Notice of Plea Agreement and Plea Agreement, United States v. Kenny Int'l
Corp., (D.D.C. filed Aug. 9, 1979), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 651 (Dec. 31, 1982).
352. Plea Agreement, Kenny Int'l., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 651.
353. Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 652.
354. Id.
355. Indictment, Crawford Enters., reprinted in 2 FOPA Rep. at 696.53-.55; Offer
of Proof, United States v. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., Crim. No. H-82-203 (S.D. Tei.
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percent (5%) of every bid that Pemex accepted to these two subdirectors-designated as the "folks." '56 In return, the "folks" would obtain purchase orders for turbine compression systems and related equipment from Pemex for the conspirators. 5 7
The conspiracy operated in the following manner. CEI set the bids,
inflated by five percent (5%), for itself, Ruston, and Solar. Solar and
Ruston agreed to use CEMCO as the subcontractor for the fabrication of
the turbine compression equipment. CEMCO's prices for the fabrication
work also included a five percent (5%) markup for the "folks." The
"folks" would cause Pemex to accept either CEI's, Ruston's or Solar's
bid on compression systems. When Pemex awarded a contract directly to
CEI,it would pay the bribe money to its Mexican agent, Grupo Industrial Delta, S.A. (Grupo Delta), which would in turn convey the funds
to the "folks." ' In those situations where Pemex awarded contracts to
either Ruston or Solar, they would pay CEMCO for its work, and
CEMCO would convey the five percent (5%) for the "folks" to CEI,
who then forwarded the money to Grupo Delta for payment to the
"folks.1 3 59 This conspiracy of pre-arranged bids and payments to foreign
officials lasted from approximately December 19, 1977 to May 1980.6'
In the fall of 1982, the DOJ brought criminal charges against, among
others, CEI, CEMCO, Ruston, International Harvester (as the parent
company of Solar) and a host of individual defendants.3 6 1 With the ex-

filed Sept. 22, 1982), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.38-.39 (Jan. 31, 1984); Offer of
Proof, United States v. C.E. Miller Corp., Crim. No. 82-788 (C.D. Cal. filed n.d.),
reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.33, 696.35 (Jan. 31, 1984); Offer of Proof, United
States v. International Harvester Co., Crim. No. H-82-244 (S.D. Tex. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 FCPA at 696.3 (Jan. 31, 1984); see Why Pemex Can't Pay Mexico's Bills,
Bus. WK., Feb. 28, 1983, at 58, 60; Riding, Pemex Inquiry Urged on Kickbacks, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 30, 1982, at 37, col. 3, at 47, col. 1; Lewin, U.S. Jury Investigating Payments to Mexicans, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1982, at D1, col. 1, at D6, col. 5.
356. Offer of Proof, Ruston Gas, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.39; Offer of
Proof, C.E. Miller Corp., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.34; Offer of Proof, International Harvester, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.3.
357. Id.
358. Offer of Proof, Ruston Gas, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.39-.40; Offer of
Proof, C.E. Miller Corp., reprintedin 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.36; Offer of Proof, International Harvester, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.3.
359. Offer of Proof, Ruston Gas, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.4; Offer of
Proof, C.E. Miller Corp., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.35-.36; Offer of Proof,
International Harvester, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.3.
360. Indictment, Crawford Enters., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.54.
361. Two related cases, United States v. King, Crim. No. 83-00020 (D.D.C. filed
Jan. 31, 1983), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.5 (Jan. 31, 1984), and United States
v. Bateman, Crim. No. 83-00005 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 4, 1983), reprinted in 2 FCPA
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ception of International Harvester, which was charged only with conspiracy to violate the FCPA, each was charged with making payments to
foreign officials or to third parties with knowledge that those parties
would convey part of the amount received to foreign officials in order to
influence those officials in the performance of their duties and to obtain
or retain business for the defendants. 62
Uncontested pleas resolved most of the actions. Ruston pleaded guilty
to a charge of violating the FCPA, paid a $750,000 fine and agreed not
to commit any further crimes. 3 CEMCO and its president, Charles E.
Miller, both pleaded guilty to similar charges and agreed not to commit
any further crimes. International Harvester pleaded guilty to conspiracy
and paid $510,000 in fines and court costs. 36 An employee of Solar,
Luis Uriarte, pleaded guilty to a charge of being an accessory after the
fact to violations of the Act. 6 5 International Harvester's employee,
George S. McLean, was the only defendant in the entire Pemex litigation
to have a jury try his case. 6 ' Prior to trial, McLean moved to dismiss
the charges against him on the grounds that International Harvester's
guilty plea to a conspiracy charge did not constitute a conviction of an
FCPA violation. 6 7 The Fifth Circuit, on appeal, said that a conspiracy
to violate the Act did not constitute a violation of the FCPA, and, therefore, International Harvester did not violate the Act. It held that "in
order to convict an employee under the FCPA for acts committed for the
benefit of his employer, the government must first convict the employer.
Because the government failed to convict Harvester and under the plea
agreement will be unable to indict Harvester and try it with McLean,

Rep. at 696.46 (Jan. 31, 1984), arose out of the Pemex facts, but charged violations of
the Currency Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1101 (1982).
362. Indictment, Crawford Enters., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.61-.66; Information, Applied Process, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.42; Information, Ruston
Gas, reprintedin 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.38; Information, C.E. Miller Corp., reprinted in
2 FCPA Rep. at 696.33; Information, International Harvester, reprinted in 2 FCPA
Rep. at 696.27-.28.
363. Plea Agreement, United States v. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., Crim. No. H-82202 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 22, 1982), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.4 (Jan. 31,

1984).
364. Notice of Plea Agreement and Plea Agreement, United States v. International
Harvester Co., Crim. No. 82-2444 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 16, 1982), reprinted in 2
FCPA Rep. at 696.31 (Jan. 31, 1984); Pasztor, Pemex Bribery Case Defendants Found
Guilty, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1985, at 2, col. 5.
365. McLean, 738 F.2d at 657 n.3.
366. Id. at 657.
367. Id.
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the Act bars McLean's prosecution. '' M Although the Fifth Circuit did
permit the United States to try McLean on the conspiracy charge
brought against him, a jury acquitted him in April 1985.
Finally, on the eve of trial, the remaining defendants entered pleas of
nolo contendere to all of the charges in the indictment.3 6" As a result of
these pleas, the court fined CEI $3,450,000370 and its president, Donald
Crawford, $309,000.371 Other defendants received fines totalling
$235,000.3172 Significantly, the court denied the DOJ's requests for
prison terms.317 This may indicate that the court believed prison terms
were unduly harsh penalties even though the Act specifically provides for
them and the conduct in this case appeared particularly egregious. The
fines imposed were certainly considerable. Perhaps the court believed a
corporate fine of $3.45 million was a sufficient deterrent.
United States v. Silicon Contractors, Inc. 7 4 demonstrates that extortion on the part of a foreign official is not a valid defense to a charge of
violating the FCPA. The corporate defendant, Silicon Contractors, Inc.
(Silicon), produced, marketed and installed sealant materials for use in
nuclear power plants.3 7 Silicon officials learned of a proposal by the
Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE), the Mexican-owned electric
power agency, to build a nuclear power plant and took steps to submit a
bid for the sealant material contract.376 As part of its preparations,
Silicon entered into a joint-venture arrangement with a Mexican firm,
Parian Internacional S.A. de C.V. (Parian). 3 " Silicon submitted a bid of
$8 million for the project, which it believed was highly competitive and
which would result in awarding the contract to Silicon.37 8
However, Silicon learned through Parian that CFE officials had demanded 10 million pesos (roughly equivalent to $450,000) before they

368. Id. at 660.
369. United States Dep't of Just., Grim. Div., Fraud Sec., Litig. Release, U.S. v.
CrawfordLitigation Is FinallyResolved [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Just. Litig. Release],
reprinted in 2 FOPA Rep. at 696.6601 (July 31, 1985); see Pemex Case Convictions,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1985, at 29, col. 1.
370. U.S. Dep't of Just. Litig. Release, supra note 358, reprinted in 2 FOPA Rep.
at 696.6601.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Grim. No. 85-251 (E.D. La., filed June 27, 1985).
375. Offer of Proof, United States v. Silicon Contractors, Inc., Grim. No. 85-251, at
1 (E.D. La. filed June 27, 1985).
376. Id. at 1-2.
377. Id. at 2.
378. Id.
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would award Silicon the contract.$7 9 Executives from Silicon and Parian
weighed the bribe demand and the possibility that a particular CFE official could actually block the contract. Herbert D. Hughes, the majority
shareholder of Silicon as well as the owner and controller of the holding
company of which Silicon was a subsidiary, and Ronald R. Richardson,
a senior officer of Hughes's holding company, ultimately considered the
problem. 80 Hughes decided to pay the bribe based on his belief that a
failure to do so would result in the loss of the contract.381 Hughes flew
from Louisiana to the Cayman Islands as part of the scheme by which
they would ultimately transfer funds to the CFE official. 82 The Louisiana airport thus became the instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly used in violation of section 104 of the Act. 8 '
This case also ended in uncontested pleas. Silicon pleaded guilty to a
charge of violating the Act, consented to the entry of a permanent injunction against it from any future violations of the Act and paid a fine of
$150,000.84 Hughes and Richardson also consented to the entry of permanent injunctions against them from any future violations of the Act.388
The Silicon case raises the question of whether it is equitable or just
to prosecute under the FCPA a company that is responding to a demand
for money from a foreign official. At first blush it would appear that the
corporation lacks the requisite evil intent because it did not initiate the
corrupt payment. However, the legislative history of the Act makes clear
that the drafters intended the antibribery provisions to apply to this precise situation:
Sections 103 and 104 cover payments and gifts intended to influence the
recipient, regardless of who first suggested the payment or gift. The defense that the payment was demanded on the part of a government official
as a price for gaining entry into a market or to obtain a contract would
not suffice since at some point the U.S. company would make a conscious
decision whether or not to pay a bribe. That the payment may have been
first proposed by the recipient rather than the U.S. company does not alter
the corrupt purpose on the part of the person paying the bribe.388

379. Id.
380. Id. at 3.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 4.
383. Information, Silicon Contractors, at 1-2.
384. Notice of Plea Agreement and Plea Agreement, Silicon Contractors, Inc., Crim.
No. 85-251, at 1-2 (E.D. La. filed June 27, 1985).
385. Id. at 2.
386. S. REP., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 10-11, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4108.
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Thus the prosecution of Silicon under the FCPA was fully warranted.
The latest DOJ case brought to enforce the antibribery provisions resulted in a guilty plea on October 2, 1985. The case of United States v.
Carpenter8 ' charged the defendant Harry Carpenter with making payments to a third party while knowing that the third party would convey
some of the money to a foreign official. Carpenter sent an international
telex to the Standard Chartered Bank of New York ordering it to pay
$580,973 to one Benson "Tunde" Akindele. Akindele wanted the money
as a commission to help Carpenter get a $10.8 million aero-medical contract with the Nigerian Government. Akindele told Carpenter he would
pay certain percentages of his commission to various Nigerian political
and military figures.3 8 In his plea, Carpenter agreed to disclose all information to the DOJ, the FBI and Customs, and to testify whenever the
DOJ required him to do so."'
The DOJ has been successful in all but one of these cases: every case
(except McLean) resulted in a guilty plea by the defendants.39 0 No substantive litigation on the merits of the FCPA bribery allegations resulted
from any of these cases. This is beneficial from a prosecutorial standpoint because plea agreements are a very efficient means of enforcing the
law while conserving resources for other, more pressing cases. On the
other hand, a plea agreement sacrifices the benefit of judicial interpretation of the FCPA. As long as the Act is not judicially construed, its
ambiguities can have a strong deterrent effect.
The SEC has brought injunctive actions to enforce the antibribery
provisions of the FCPA.3 91 In Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Katy Industries, Inc.392 the SEC charged that the defendant had violated
the FCPA in order to obtain an oil production contract in Indonesia.

387. Information, Carpenter, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.79.
388. Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Release, United States v. Carpenter, Oct. 2, 1985,
reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.79 (Jan. 1, 1986).
389. Notice of Plea Agreement and Plea Agreement, United States v. Carpenter,
Crim. No. 85-353 (D.N.J. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.80 (Jan. 1,
1986).
390. See supra notes 345-89 and accompanying text.
391. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Certain Ancillary Relief, Securities
and Exch. Comm'n v. Sam P. Wallace Co., Civ. No. 81-1915 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 13,
1981), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 683 (Dec. 31, 1982); Complaint for Permanent
Injunction and for Other Equitable Relief, Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., No. 80-2961 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20, 1980), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at
637 (Dec. 31, 1982); Complaint, Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Katy Indus., Inc., No.
78C-3476 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 30, 1978), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 616 (Dec. 31,
1982).
392. Complaint, Katy Indus., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 616.
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Specifically, the complaint alleged that Katy had employed as a consultant a close personal friend of a high-level Indonesian official; that a Katy
director and this consultant had met with the official and his representative and had agreed that if Katy received the oil production sharing contract it would compensate the consultant; and that the director was told
that the consultant would give a portion of this compensation to the official and his representative. The complaint further alleged that Katy had
entered into an agreement with the consultant and had later obtained a
30-year oil production sharing contract in Indonesia.'" 3 The SEC sought
a permanent injunction of any further violations of section 103 of the
Act.S The court entered the injunction against all defendants in the
action through a consent order.
The SEC sought similar relief in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 95 The SEC alleged that the defendant
had paid substantial sums to "finders" or "consultants," which sums
were disproportionate to the business obtained or services rendered. The
SEC also alleged that the defendant had made the payments under circumstances that indicated that the funds were passed along to foreign
government officials. 9 6 A government injunction was issued against
Tesoro pursuant to a consent order in which the corporation undertook
not to make any future payments in violation of the FCPA. 97
The last action that the SEC brought to enforce section 103 of the Act
was Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sam P. Wallace Co.39 8
The SEC again sought injunctive relief, complaining that the defendant
Wallace Co. had paid at least $1.391 million to a foreign official to aid
in the company's procuring and maintaining contracts with that foreign
government. Wallace Co. and the individual defendants consented to the
entry of permanent injunctions against them. 99 Curiously enough, this is

393. Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 618-19.
394. Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 617. The SEC also sought injunctions from
any further violations of the 10(b), proxy statements and registration statement sections
of the 1934 Act. Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 617.
395. Complaint, Tesoro Petroleum, reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 637.
396. Id., reprintedin 2 FCPA Rep. at 638-40. The complaint also alleged violations
of sections 13(a) and 14(a) of the 1934 Act. Id.
397. Consent and Undertaking of Tesoro Petroleum Corp., Securities and Exch.
Comm'n v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., No. 80-2961 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 6, 1980), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 641-42 (Dec. 31, 1982).
398. Complaint, Sam P. Wallace Co., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 683.
399. Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction Against Sam P. Wallace Co., Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Sam P. Wallace Co., No. 81-1915 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 13,
1981), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 689 (Dec. 31, 1982).
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the only case that was also the subject of a DOJ action. 0 0 Wallace Co.
pleaded guilty to the felony charge and received a $30,000 fine for violations of the FCPA.4 01 One of the individual defendants, Alfonso A. Rodriguez, the president of a Wallace Co. subsidiary, also pleaded guilty,
but received a sentence of probation for reasons of ill-health.40 2
Again, each of these cases was successful for the SEC: each ended
with a consent to a permanent injunction. These cases are important
because they indicate how the SEC has actually enforced the antibribery
provisions, and not just the accounting provisions, of the FCPA. However, there have been instances in which allegations of foreign bribery
have been made but then ignored in the rest of the action.
B.

Actions Which Merely Allege Foreign Bribery

The SEC generally alleges FCPA violations as part of its laundry list
of violations40 3 under either the 1934 Act or the Securities Act of
1933. °0 Usually this means the SEC will allege violations of the accounting provisions along with violations of sections 13 and 14 of the
1934 Act. Occasionally, the SEC will allege violations of the antibribery
provisions but will neglect to pursue these violations and proceed solely
under violations of the accounting provisions.40 5
This occurred in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Page Airways, Inc. 406 The SEC specifically alleged in its complaint that Page
Airways had made illegal payments to government officials and employ-

400. Information, United States v. Sam P. Wallace Co., Crim. No. 83-0034 (D.P.R.
filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 690.01 (Jan. 31, 1984).
401. Notice of Plea Agreement and Plea Agreement by Sam P. Wallace Co., United
States v. Sam P. Wallace Co., Crim. No. 83-0034 (D.P.R. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2
FCPA Rep. at 690.04 (Jan. 31, 1984).
402. Notice of Plea Agreement and Plea Agreement by Alphonso A. Rodriguez,
[sic], (D.P.R. dated Mar. 11, 1983),
United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 83reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 690.1 (Jan. 31, 1984). Rodriguez died shortly after the
entry of the guilty plea.
403. Peloso, Enforcement Developments, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:
THREE YEARS AFTER PASSAGE 275 (Practicing Law Institute, Corporate Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 360, 1981); White Collar Crime, supra note 250,
at 516-17.
404. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982).
405. Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., No. 791760 (D.D.C. filed July 9, 1979), SEC Litig. Release Dec. 17, 1979, reprinted in 2
FCPA Rep. at 635 (Dec. 31, 1982); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Page Airways, Inc.,
[1978 Decisions Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,393 (D.D.C. 1978).
406. [1978 Decisions Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %96,393, 93,389
(D.D.C. 1978).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

488

[Vol. 20.431

ees in Gabon, Malaysia, the Ivory Coast, Morocco and Uganda 0 7 in
connection with the sales of aircraft to those governments."0 8 The SEC
also alleged violations of sections 10(b), 13(a) and 14(a) of the 1934 Act,
and of the accounting provisions of the FCPA. 0 9 However, in its prayer
for relief the SEC requested injunctions only from violations of the 1934
Act and of the accounting provisions. 410 Page Airways consented to these
injunctions. The SEC gave no explanation as to why it did not seek
enforcement of the antibribery provisions.
The same situation is present in Securities and Exchange Commission
v. InternationalSystems & Controls Corp."1 The complaint specifically
alleged that the issuer had paid more than $23 million to foreign persons
and entities in connection with the procurement of contracts.' 1 2 However, the SEC sought injunctive relief only in relation to 1934 Act viola13
tions and violations of the accounting provisions of the FCPA.
No apparent reason exists as to why the SEC has failed to pursue the
antibribery allegations. Given the presence of both violations, perhaps
the SEC would prefer to enforce its own territory-namely, the accounting violations. This seems implausible, however. The SEC alleged 1934
Act and accounting provisions violations in both Katy Industries4' 4 and
Tesoro Petroleum,415 yet chose to seek enforcement based on the antibribery provisions. Perhaps the answer lies solely with prosecutorial
416
discretion-or personal fancy.

407. Part of these payments included a Cadillac Eldorado convertible given to Idi
Amin Dada. Id. at 93,392.
408.

Id. at 93,391-92.

409.

Id. at 93,389-90.

410.

Id. at 93,394-95; see Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 548-49.

411. No. 79-1760 (D.D.C. filed July 9, 1979), SEC Litig. Release Dec. 17, 1979,
reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 635 (Dec. 31, 1984).
412.

Id.

413.

Id., reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 636.

414. No. 78c-3476 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 30, 1978).
415.

No. 80-2961 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20, 1980).

416. The SEC has admitted that the antibribery provisions are not an important part
of its enforcement arsenal, partly because of the difficulties present in overseas investigations. Witherspoon, supra note 42, at 548-49. The SEC may view enforcement of the
antibribery provisions as unnecessary, either in light of other more substantial allegations, or in the absence of available evidence of foreign bribery. Peloso, supra note 403,
at 269-70.
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C. DOJ Investigations of FCPA Violations
The DOJ has several enforcement mechanisms 417 at its disposal when
it seeks to punish criminal violations of the FCPA. However, it employs
none of these methods until a thorough investigation of an allegation of
foreign bribery produces reasonable certainty that the violation did occur. Other agencies or departments, such as the SEC or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), refer allegations of wrongdoing to the
DOJ.4 18 The DOJ then conducts an investigation using a unique ap'419
proach suited to "the unique nature of the Act."
1. DOJ Investigative Procedures
The foreign policy implications of an allegation of foreign bribery require that the DOJ confine its initial investigation to United States
sources. The DOJ will take evidence primarily from witnesses, corporate
books and records and bank records in the United States.4 20 In this fashion, the DOJ can control the dissemination of any information it obtains.
The DOJ does not notify the foreign government involved that an investigation is occurring, thus avoiding the strain to foreign relations that
would inevitably accompany uncorroborated allegations of corruptness in
a foreign official. 421 Nondisclosure is particularly desirable in the early
stages of an investigation in view of the fact that the DOJ closes a significant number of these investigations without filing charges.4 22
The DOJ does not notify the Department of State (DOS) that it is
conducting an investigation. 423 The DOJ and the DOS jointly implemented this policy, which they designed "to avoid politicization of these
investigations in a way that could prove embarrassing to the United
States.1 2 4 The policy eliminates the possibility that a United States ambassador to a foreign country may have to dissemble about what he may
or may not know regarding an investigation.4 25 The DOJ will notify the

417. The DOJ can seek civil injunctions, criminal convictions and fines and any
other relief deemed appropriate under the circumstances. FCPA § 104(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C.

§ 78dd-2(b)-(c) (1982).
418. Clark Interview, supra note 297.
419.

Shine, Enforcement of the FCPA by the Department ofJustice, 9 SYRACUSE

INT'L L. & CoM. 283, 291 (1982).

420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

Id. at 291-92.
Id. at 291.
Id.; see infra notes 445-49 and accompanying text.
Shine, supra note 419, at 291.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 291-93; Clark Interview, supra note 297.
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DOS once it reasonably anticipates that the investigation has progressed
to a point where it will make the allegation or the investigation public.426
At that time the DOJ will provide all necessary information to the DOS.
The DOS will then work through normal diplomatic channels to disclose
the investigation to foreign officials in the appropriate ministry.4 27
Once the DOJ has notified the foreign government of the investigation, the DOJ will generally refuse to withhold the identity of that country or its official or both from the public pleadings.1 28 The DOJ will
agree to nondisclosure of identity only as part of a plea bargain, 420 and
even then a sufficient law enforcement or foreign policy basis must justify the agreement.430 A significant risk of death or serious physical injury to the persons involved, if their identities are made known, is a
sufficient law enforcement basis to justify nondisclosure. 43 The DOS
must communicate to the DOJ in writing any foreign policy reasons that
would justify nondisclosure. 3 2 As yet, no circumstances requiring the
nondisclosure of the country or foreign officials under investigation have
arisen.43 3
Often, when a DOJ investigation has uncovered violations of the
FCPA, evidence also exists of violations of the foreign country's domestic
bribery laws. The DOJ will disclose the results of its investigations to
that country if it believes it will receive investigative assistance through
that country's interest in prosecuting violations of its own law. 34 The
DOJ follows a special procedure in asking for assistance. First, it will
approach the foreign government only on a prosecutor-to-prosecutor basis and never through an international agency (such as Interpol). 3 5
Next, once the DOJ is certain that the foreign government will provide

426. Shine, supra note 419, at 293. For example, a witness testifying before a grand
jury on the matter is absolutely privileged to leave after the hearing, hold a press conference and disclose his testimony. Also, the DOJ may be on the verge of filing a criminal
complaint. Id.; Clark Interview, supra note 297.
427. Shine, supra note 419, at 293.
428. This policy arose out of difficulties that the DOJ had in prosecuting United
States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Crim., No. 78-566 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 29, 1978).
See Shine, supra note 419, at 293-94.
429. In case of a litigated indictment, all details that are to be proved at trial must be
alleged in the pleadings, including the identity of all parties involved. Shine, supra note
419, at 294.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 295.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
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help, it will ask for an executive agreement on mutual assistance, the
terms of which limit it to that particular investigation. 4 6 Furthermore,
the agreements are limited to investigations of illicit payments.437 The
agreements have two purposes: they obligate the DOJ and the appropriate foreign ministry to keep confidential all information exchanged as
part of the agreement; 4 8 and they obligate the DOJ and the foreign
ministry to use best efforts to assist each other in the investigation and in
any possible prosecutions.43 9
2.

DOJ Investigative Considerations

During its investigation, the DOJ will weigh particular considerations
heavily in its evaluation of the evidence it discovers. Many of these considerations resemble the enforcement priorities in a review procedure. A
primary concern is the size and nature of the payment made to the foreign official.4 40 The DOJ will examine the level of influence held by the
payor and the payee, including whether the payment was concealed from
the payor's management, and whether the management conducted investigations of any possible illicit payments. 441 The DOJ also notes the legality of the payment in that country and the effect there of disclosure of
the payment. 4 2
The DOJ will also probe the method of payment. This includes the
means used to accumulate funds, any possible involvement of subsidiary
corporations, the general condition of the corporate account books and
records, and the existence of internal corporate controls or codes of conduct. 4 3 The DOJ will look at the nature of the competition in the foreign country, the company's motives for making the payment and the
effectiveness of the bribe. The DOJ will search particularly for any indications of commercial or political bribery in the United States as a motive for making the bribe. Finally, the DOJ will consider whether the
444
SEC has concurrent jurisdiction over the crime.

436. Id. at 296-97.
437. Id. at 297.
438. Id. at 296.
439. Id. at 297.
440. Remarks of Roger M. Olsen, Special Couns. to the Assoc. Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Just., Before the Section of Int'l L. & Prac. of the A.B.A., Aug. 2, 1983 [hereinafter Olsen Remarks], reprinted in 1 FOPA Rep. at 179-80 (Sept. 15, 1983).
441. Id., reprinted in 1 FCPA Rep. at 180-81.
442. Id.
443. Id., reprinted in 1 FCPA Rep. at 181-82.
444. Id., reprinted in 1 FCPA Rep. at 183.

492

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

3.

LAW

[Vol 20:431

Summary of Investigations Closed by the DOJ

Whether a DOJ investigation will result in an enforcement action depends on the presence and weight of the factors discussed above. The
DOJ has closed a large number of investigations without prosecution
4 5 In these cases, the primary reason not to commence
under the FCPA."
an enforcement action has been a finding that the conduct in question
did not violate the FCPA or that there is insufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations of foreign bribery. 4 8 Certain other cases involved de
minimis payments or technical violations of the Act and thus did not
warrant prosecution." 7 Some investigations terminated because the government could not produce for testimony a foreign witness not subject to
the subpoena power of United States courts or because the foreign government involved declined to give assistance.""' Finally, the government
prosecuted certain cases of blatant wrongdoing under other United States
laws.

4 49

Investigations by the DOJ 450 are continuing, with most details kept
strictly confidential. 5 1 Companies that have come under scrutiny include
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 52 General Dynamics Corp., 5 3 General
Electric Co., 4'" GTE Corp.,45 United Technologies Corp.,4 6 LTV
445. Shine, supra note 419, at 291; Olsen Remarks, supra note 440, reprinted in I
FCPA Rep. at 179, 191-200.01.
446. Olsen Remarks, supra note 440, reprinted in I FCPA Rep. at 191-200.01.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. The SEC has also continued to investigate allegations of illegal foreign payments, most notably, alleged payments by Ashland Oil Inc. and General Dynamics Corp.

See Ingersoll & Lubove, SEC Charges Ashland and Ex-Chairman Made Illegal Foreign Paymentsfor Oil, Wall St. J., July 9, 1986, at 4, col. 2; Ingersoll, SEC Votes to Sue
Ashland, Ex-Aide in Bribery Case, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1986, at 14, col. 4; SEC Is Said
to Be Probing General Dynamics Corp., Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1985, at 4, col. 3.
451. Clark Interview, supra note 297.
452. See Gerth, supra note 323, at 1, col. 4, at 18, col. 3; Pasztor & Ingersoll, Recent

Charges of Payoffs by Companies Coincide With Bid to Relax Law Barring Overseas
Bribes, Wall St. J., July 10, 1986, at 54, col. 1; Pound, Westinghouse'sManila Dealings
are Investigated, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
453. Bird & Holland, South Korea: The Big Payoff, THE NATION, Oct. 26, 1985, at

401; Ingersoll & Pound, Payments by U.S. Defense Contractors to South Korean Firm
are Investigated, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1985, at 20, col. 2; General Dynamics Under Fire,
TIME, Apr. 8, 1985, at 23-24. General Dynamics has also been under investigation by
the SEC. See supra note 450.
454. Ingersoll & Pound, supra note 453, at 20, col. 2.
455. Gerth, supra note 323, at 1, col. 4, at 18, col. 3.
456. Ingersoll & Pound, supra note 453, at 20, col. 2.
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Corp.,457 Martin Marietta Corp.458 and Bechtel Group Inc.4 59 The
DOJ's activities indicate that it has not ceased to enforce the Act despite
a lack of publicity.46 0
VI.

THE FUTURE OF THE

FCPA

Rightly or wrongly, the international business community perceives
the FCPA as a trade disincentive for American businesses abroad. Companies want and need reassurances that they will be able to pursue legitimate profit-making opportunites without running afoul of the Act and
that they need not forego such opportunities because of uncertainty as to
whether such conduct will cause them to incur liability. Two options
exist that can provide these reassurances: (1) the institution of FCPA
guidelines or a more informative review procedure or both, or (2) the
amendment of the FCPA.
A.

Potentialfor Guidelines

The DOJ has made clear that it sees no need for FCPA guidelines. It
believes its policies in pursuing enforcement of the Act will provide reasonable assurances that only blatant, intentional activities by a company
will result in a prosecution. Also, the DOJ feels that the promulgation of
guidelines will in itself unduly restrict businesses in structuring their
transactions, with the result that the impracticality of the guidelines will
outweigh the benefit. The DOJ is certain that its current review procedures are the most efficient, practical and flexible means of giving guidance to the business community. Therefore, it seems safe to say that
without a congressional mandate, no other assistance in construing the
Act will be forthcoming from the DOJ.
B.

Potentialfor Amendment

From the standpoint of the business community, the refusal of the
DOJ to issue guidelines makes amendment of the FCPA an absolute
necessity. Only Congress can clear away the Act's ambiguities. Recent

457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Grieves, Korean Contact-ChargesAgainst Bechtel, TIME, May 7, 1984, at
86-88; Taylor, Bechtel Said to Be Linked to Bid-Rigging, Bribes in Getting Contracts in
South Korea, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1984, at 2, col. 3; Bechtel Begins an Inquiry Into
Korea Bribe Charges, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
460. Clark Interview, supra note 297; see Pasztor & Ingersoll, supra note 452, at

54, cols. 4-5.

494

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol 20.431

sessions of Congress have resulted in no definitive action. However, there
have been indications that actual passage of a bill to amend the FCPA
may occur in the not-too-distant future. In all likelihood, H.R. 3 and S.
430 will be reintroduced, with H.R. 3 probably having a better chance
of ultimate passage. Certainly H.R. 3, like its predecessor H.R. 4800, is
a vast improvement over the FCPA: it removes many of the imperfections of the Act and, at the same time, can hardly be said to gut the law.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Because of the prevailing view that the FCPA's antibribery provisions
are too vague and ambiguous, American companies have foregone legitimate business opportunities abroad rather than risk violating the Act.
This chilling effect goes beyond the sacrifice of "sales for integrity" that
Congress was willing to make in 1977, particularly when no other nation in the world has followed the United States example and enacted an
extraterritorial antibribery law. The extreme competitive disadvantage to
which the FCPA puts United States companies requires that Congress
give them some guidance as to the bounds of acceptable corporate behavior. The DOJ's review procedure has not provided this assistance. The
disclosure requirements of the review procedure must be amended in a
way that will encourage, rather then discourage, requests from the business community. True guidelines containing acceptable model transactions, such as those that the Antitrust Merger Guidelines established,
should be created. One cannot overemphasize the need for guidelines
from the DOJ. This is particularly true because it appears that every
enforcement proceeding will be settled, as in the past, by plea agreements. While this conserves DOJ resources by sparing it the expenses of
prosecution, it also prevents adjudication of the foreign bribery issues
and thereby forecloses any opportunity of a judicial interpretation of the
FCPA provisions. Without case law, the Act will remain vague and ambiguous. Failing action by the DOJ, Congress must rectify this situation
by passing a bill to amend the Act. If Congress will not change the antibribery provisions for fear that the international business community
will perceive that as condoning bribery, it must at least issue a mandate
to the DOJ to implement a new review procedure and establish
guidelines.

